LTKnygoje nagrinėjami antropologinio - žmogaus ir gyvūno - skirtumo pavidalai fenomenologinėje hermeneutinėje filosofijoje. Maxo Schelerio, Martino Heideggerio, Eugeno Finko filosofijoje antropologinis skirtumas atliko svarbų vaidmenį apibrėžiant žmogaus esmę. Monografijoje tiriama, kokie motyvai ir prielaidos lėmė, kad mąstytojai atskyrė žmogų ir gyvūnus esmės skirtumu. Giorgio Agambenas ir Jacques‘as Derrida XX amžiaus pabaigoje įtikinamai parodė, koks yra antropologinio skirtumo ir prievartos ryšys, kaip žmogaus konstitucija yra susijusi su prievarta nežmogiškų ar nepakankamai žmogiškų būtybių atžvilgiu. Knygoje aiškinamasi, kokie yra antropogenezės mechanizmai ir kokios yra antropologinės mašinos sustabdymo ar radikalaus žmogaus esmės kvestionavimo gyvūno akivaizdoje perspektyvos. Savo ruožtu šiuolaikinė fenomenologija įrodo žmogaus ir gyvūnų tapatumą intencionalumo ir ego struktūrų požiūriu, tačiau antropologinio skirtumo visiškai neatmeta ir jį traktuoja kaip patirties ribą, kuri pasirodo santykyje su ribiniais subjektais - gyvūnais. Monografijoje nagrinėjamas žmogaus ir gyvūnų artimumas ir skirtingumas intencionalumo ir empatijos požiūriu, atskleidžiamas žmogaus patirties antropocentriškumas, kurį siūloma skirti nuo antropocentrizmo kaip žmogaus išskirtinumo ideologijos. Antropoceno krizė verčia kelti klausimą apie žmogų kaip kaltininką. Plėtojant šiukšlių fenomenologiją parodoma, kad antropologinis skirtumas pasidaro aktualus nebe kaip esmės, bet kaip atsakomybės skirtumas. [Anotacija knygoje]
ENIn the early phenomenological hermeneutical philosophy and philosophical anthropology, the difference between the human and the animal has played an important role in the search for the essence of the human. Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, and Eugen Fink drew a difference, radically distinguishing between the human and the animal. By exposing anthropocentrism as an ideology of human exceptionalism and showing that the anthropological difference functions as an apparatus of violence, the post-humanist critique of anthropocentrism forms an attitude to analyse the anthropological difference only as an artificial construct which enables and extenuates the violent hierarchical relationship between the human and the animal. The following questions arise: To what extent can the apparatus of violence be recognised in the works of the phenomenological hermeneutical philosophy thinkers of the early twentieth century? How can such thinking be understood today? To what extent can this philosophy offer anything to the critics of these apparatuses? How can the problem of the anthropological difference be developed in the contemporary phenomenological hermeneutical philosophy?.The aim of this monograph is to investigate the problem of the anthropological difference in the phenomenological hermeneutical philosophy. Giorgio Agambens and Jacques Derridas critique of the anthropological difference and the question of violence are the main motives of this monograph, playing an important part in it. However, with regard to the works of thinkers of the first half of the twentieth century, there exists a view that in order to understand how the anthropological difference is defined and what function it plays, it is necessary to identify the motives, conditions, and presuppositions on which it is drawn. This monograph also seeks to elucidate not only the underlying presuppositions as to why thinkers of the past thought of the anthropological difference in this way and not the other way around, but also how the anthropological difference can be thought of today. The aim is to findout, by means of phenomenology, to what extent the anthropological difference is rooted in human experience, how it appears, and what significance it has in defining the boundaries of human experience and animal understanding. In turn, the Anthropocene as an epoch of crisis is forcing a new approach towards the question of the human. The aim is to develop the idea of reinterpreting the human and the anthropological difference itself in terms of the consequences of human activity and the dimension of responsibility. The research done in this monograph is not thematically and methodologically homogeneous as the very development of the anthropological difference in the phenomenological hermeneutical philosophy is not such. Different topics and issues do not require the same approach.Two lines of development of the anthropological difference can be distinguished when looking at the more than a hundred-year-old tradition of the phenomenological hermeneutical philosophy from today's perspective. In the first, it emerges as a difference of the essence and plays an important role in defining the essence of the human, and later becomes the object of criticism which is questioned. In the second, it appears as an insignificant difference that comes to mind when addressing the boundaries of the human world and experience. Both reject the notions of the animal of the Modernity as a living mechanism and the human as an exceptional, reasonable being. However, the two lines of development diverged in different directions and are followed by contrasting attitudes and approaches to the anthropological difference. The first line of development - hermeneutics of facticity and philosophical anthropology - sought to define the human and the animal, and their difference in terms of the essence. Although the biological human-animal proximity was recognised, even the proximity on the basis of intentionality aimed to draw the difference of the essence. The philosophies of Scheler, Heidegger, and Fink lead this line of development. Here an attempt was made to re-articulate the essence of the human. The human question was central whereas the animal stayed on the periphery, and the anthropological difference itself served the function of division and definition. This line of development was criticised by Derrida and Agamben. Here the issue shifted and the question of animals and violence against them became central. The anthropological difference became the most significant object of criticism by revealing the connection between human constitution and violence. In this context, the essence of the human and the animal appears only in a question form. [From the publication]