Racionalumas ar teisingumas? (Post)moderni utopija XX a. pabaigos politinėje filosofijoje

LTMonografijos medžiagą galima panaudoti Lietuvos mokslo institucijose filosofijos, politologijos ir sociologijos specialybių programose, dėstant politinės filosofijos, socialinės filosofijos, postmodernios filosofijos, metafilosofijos, etikos, RPT, lošimų teorijos ir socialinės evoliucijos teorijos kursus. Ji gali būti pravarti mokslininkams, kurie domisi racionaliu politinio elgesio modeliavimu, racionalaus konsensuso problema, politinio racionalizmo ir socialinio reliatyvizmo kolizijomis bei postmodernia politine filosofija, racionalumo, teisingumo ir moralės santykiu, politinės filosofijos metodologinėmis problemomis, lošimų teorijos taikymo politinėje ir socialinėje filosofijoje galimybėmis. Taip pat ji skirta visiems, kam įdomus mąstymas apie valstybę ir žmonių buvimą kartu. [Anotacija knygoje]

EN[...] My investigation concentrates on four theories which represent rationalist or antirationalist aproaches in political philosophy. The theories picked out are those of Rawls, Binmore, Lyotard and Baudrillard because of their relative importance. What I'm trying to do is to investigate the relationship between rationality and justice in these prominent conceptions located on the contrary poles (even stylistically) of political philosophy, and to develop a perspective which allows to compare them in spite of paradigmic differences. My tasks are the following: 1) to identify the reasons why in political philosophy the idea of a rational model of society is problematic; 2) to explore the internal consistency of the view on rationality held in each of the theories and to reconstruct their implicit presuppositions; 3) to expose friction between the ideals of rationality and justice; 4) to compare the different ways of dealing with rationality in relation to justice and to point out their main shortcomings; 5) to relate the problem of rationality in political philosophy and the problem of political philosophy itself. The original contribution of the paper is the provided analysis of the theories separately as well as in relation to each other, comparing them as four logical possibilities of coping with the problem of rationality in political philosophy, and paying attention at the impact the view on rationality has on the status of political philosophy as a separate discipline. The paper shows the unremovable paradoxality at the heart of Rawls's theory of justice and points out some internal problems within Binmore's political conception.I hope to prove that political philosophy (if its main object remains justice) can neither fully accept nor give up the idea of a rational model of society because of logical reasons: all the attempts to relate the concepts of rationality and justice deductively, or to divorce them strictly, or to give them up, spawn contraimplications and destroy the sovereignty of political philosophy. And Rawlsian project to tie up rationality and justice preserving the autonomy of both concepts at the same time, is contradictory per se. The thesis splits into six points: 1) Rawls's early project to make a universal theory of justice in terms of Rational Choice Theory is logically impossible: the model of society such that the same reason accounts for its being both rational and just, while the autonomy of the concepts is still to some extent maintained, is doomed to hesitate between two types of normativity neither of which can be derived from the other, nor held appart from it, nor be prefered to it, nor held to be on a par with it, if the project itself is preserved. 2) The same goes for Political liberalism, because both its innovations -the distinctions between politics and metaphysics and the rational as opposed to the resonable - cannot be saved and the attempts to keep them up make the ideal of justice more geometrico even more unattainable (a "well-ordered society" becomes not rational and fair enough). 3) Binmore's and Lyotard's political conceptions may be understood as two alternative logical possibilities to cope with Rawlsian dilemma: each of them aims to realize one of Rawls's two ends (justice or rationality) at the cost of another. 4) Binmore transformes Rawls's Theory of Justice and manages to diminish friction between justice and rationality by reducing the former into the later, but his theory is not as consistent as it claims to be and makes political philosophy into a branch of Rational Choice Theory.5) Lyotard, on the contrary, strictly separates justice from rationality and totally gives up the idea of a rational model of society, but his antirationalistic theory of justice suffers from serious shortcomings and is possible as such only in so far as some contested presuppositions are still made; moreover his theory expands political philosophy to philosophy par excellence (of course, understood in his own sense: political philosophy becomes a Kantian critique of political dimensions of what is called "rationality"). 6) Baudrillard's gives up the idea of a rational model of society even in a more consistent and radical manner: he goes without the very idea of justice and consciously destroys political philosophy itself, yet even he preserves some of its rationalistic assumptions. The methods applied are rational reconstruction as well as conceptual, comparative and logical analyses. The book consists of the introduction, four parts each dealing with one of the theories and arranged according to the logic of the research, the conclusions and the bibliography. [From the publication]

• Pilnutinė demokratija ir XX a. politinė mintis / Laurynas Peluritis. Lietuvių katalikų mokslo akademijos metraštis 2022, t. 45, p. 300-314.
• Racionalumo ir teisingumo sąjungos problema Johno Rawlso „Politiniame liberalizme” / Nida Vasiliauskaitė. Problemos. 2012, t. 82, p. 126-138.