Lietuvos su Klaipėda ir Vilniumi genezė: anglų ir rusų "Didžiojo žaidimo" Baltijos aspektas

LTTyrimo temą inspiravo 1920 m. įvykių dinamika, esmingai paveikusi tiek Lietuvą, tiek ir visą Rytų Europą (Lenkijos ir Sovietų Rusijos karas, Spa konferencija, Lietuvos ir Sovietų Rusijos Maskvos sutartis, Lenkijos ir Sovietų Rusijos Rygos sutartis, generolo L. Żeligowskio žygis į Vilnių). Istorinis paveikslas gerokai pasipildė į kontekstą įtraukus Anglijos–Rusijos geopolitinės ašies veiksnį. Siekiant identifikuoti šios ašies genezę bei motyvaciją, išplėsta tyrimo laiko skalė – eventualiai iki XVIII a. – ir aptarti tokie regiono raidai įtakos turėję veiksniai kaip tarptautinė prekyba, apšvieta, politinių laisvių plėtra bei egzistencinio saugumo sampratos vystymasis. Atskleista intriguojanti sąsaja tarp lietuvių modernaus politinio „mentalinio žemėlapio" formavimosi iš vienos pusės ir Anglijos–Rusijos interesų sandūros Rytų Pabaltijyje iš kitos. [Anotacija knygoje]

ENHistorians are well aware of how the Vilnius and Klaipėda problems plagued Lithuania, and in a sense the entire international community, throughout the interwar period. There were various ways to solve these problems: Lithuania was offered to exchange one city for another, or to abandon the cities altogether. But even then, the keen mind of Arnold Toynbee concluded that both Vilnius and Klaipėda are organically linked with Lithuanian national statehood. After the Second World War, ideological wars prevented the problem of Lithuania being dealt with; moreover, since there was no Lithuanian statehood itself. But even since the restoration of Lithuania's independence, oddly enough, the problem has not been solved. Rather, the prevailing belief is that the Vilnius and Klaipėda problems are only the result of Lithuanian nationalist visions, adherence to faithful dogmas, which are not subject to reason; and the fact that these cities were part of Lithuania's restored statehood only as the result of Stalin's 'gifts', therefore, cannot be reasonably explained. It turns out that the present Lithuania is an actual reality without historical logic. But this conclusion offends not only Toynbee, but maybe also Hegel ... This study is an attempt to explain the emergence of Lithuania with Vilnius and Klaipėda.The factor of the British-Russian geopolitical axis can be viewed as an essential external prerequisite for the formation of the idea of modern Lithuania with Klaipėda and Vilnius. Throughout history, relations between Britain and Russia have ranged from pragmatic cooperation to bitter confrontation. The cooperation was primarily due to trading interests. The port of Klaipėda (as an ice-free port, in contrast to the ports to the north) has played a potentially important role in the vector of British-Russian trade across the Baltic Sea. At the political level, the rapprochement between Britain and Russia was due to a common interest in ousting competitors from the Baltic region: Prussia/Germany, and France/Poland. The periods of convergence of British-Russian interests created objective preconditions for the unification of the territories inhabited by Lithuanians in East Prussia and Russia. The prospect of such a combination contributed to the emergence of the Lithuanian mental map as an ideological basis for the formation of national Lithuanian statehood. However, during periods of conflict between Britain and Russia, the Lithuanian ethnos showed an intensification in the process of assimilation, mainly Germanisation and Polonization.The convergence of British and Russian political interests regarding the territory inhabited by Lithuanians was observed during the Seven Years' War, although formally these states fought in opposite blocs. Russia sought to separate the northern part of Prussia, with the port of Klaipėda, intending to transfer the territory to the Republic of Two Nations in exchange for its eastern territories; even though there was also the option of joining Klaipeda to the empire. Britain's position in these goals of Russia can be viewed as favorably neutral. The next time British and Russian interests converged was on the eve of the Battle of Austerlitz, when the British-funded Russian army planned a war with Prussia, again with the aim of tearing oflF its northern part, together with the port of Klaipėda, possibly including it in a restored Republic, located in the protectorate of Russia. In both cases, the reconstruction did not take place, but a kind of design precedent remained, the prospects of which should have been facilitated by two motives. The first is geopolitical, since the fact of the inclusion of the port of Klaipėda in the Republic (or Russia) would correlate with the tendencies towards separatism in Lithuania. The second motive is legal, because only with allied relations between Russia and Great Britain could one hope to achieve international recognition of such a territorial reconstruction. After the Seven Years' War, a strategy (the Northern System) prevailed in Russia, according to which Prussia, and possibly the entire northern flank of Europe, would be considered as strategic partners necessary primarily to the international legitimacy o f Russia. The orientation of Russia towards Prussia, and then towards the German Empire, contributed to the division of the Republic, as well as the gradual spread of German influence to the east. [...]. [From the publication]