Atskirieji pasienio apsaugos batalionai Lietuvos ginkluotosios gynybos sistemoje: V bataliono 1939 m. atvejo analizė

LTTarpukario Lietuvos kariuomenės gynybos planuose priedanga – vienas svarbiausių elementų, lemiančių mobilizacijos ir tolesnių karinių operacijų sėkmę. 1939 m. rudenį, kaimyninėse valstybėse kilus kariniam konfliktui, buvo paskelbta visų, išskyrus I ir II, atskirųjų pasienio apsaugos batalionų mobilizacija. Šie priedangos daliniai buvo formuojami prie pat valstybės sienos, turėjo pirmieji sutikti ir stabdyti priešą, taip vykdydami priedangos užduotis ir laimėdami laiko visos kariuomenės mobilizacijai atlikti. Šiame straipsnyje analizuojama V atskirojo pasienio apsaugos bataliono veikla: jo formavimo ypatumai, pašauktųjų tarnauti patikimumas ir lojalumas valstybei, kaip buvo organizuojama tarnyba, vykdomos užduotys, bataliono pasirengimas, kovinė galia susiklosčiusioje situacijoje, logistika, buitis, išformavimas. Pateikiamos bataliono dalinių išdėstymo schemos. Autoriaus nuomone, to laikotarpio tekstai pagyvina straipsnį ir suteikia jam įdomių atspalvių, todėl pirminių šaltinių kalba taisyta minimaliai. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Pasienio apsauga; Kariuomenė; 20 amžius; Tarpukaris; Mobilizacija; Army; Interwar; 20th century; Mobilization; Border security.

ENIn a small state in which a larger part of its territory could be occupied very quickly by a much more powerful enemy, it is very important to win time for the mobilisation of the army in any situation which warrants such a mobilisation. For this purpose, covering teams were assigned by the Lithuanian Armed Forces, which consisted of regular units, while separate border protection battalions (hereinafter referred to as BPBs) were mobilised separately from the armed forces, and only in the event of there being a specific threat of military conflict. In the autumn of 1939, following the military conflict in neighbouring countries, the mobilisation of BPBs was announced. These covering units were formed near the state border, and were expected to be the first to meet and stop the enemy, thereby carrying out the required covering duties and winning time for the mobilisation of the main army units. This study, which is based on primary sources, analyses the activities of the 5th BPB in the period between 1 September and 15 November 1939, taking a closer look at the formation of the battalion, the reliability and loyalty of the state’s conscripts, the organisation of the services, the tasks which were being carried out, the preparations of the battalion, logistics, and everyday activities, and looking at their potential combat power and the situation at their duty location. To achieve the aim of the study, it was necessary to examine the historiographical material and primary sources and, therefore, a method of analysis was used which is also prevalent in scientific literature and archival documents.Conclusions: when forming the 5th BPB, the composition of this battalion, as specified in Order No 1 which was issued by its commander, dated 1 September 1939, was achieved only on the following day, 2 September, and accounted for about 93% of all of the planned wartime posts No 119; on 1 September 1939, the composition of the BPB consisted of about 78% of all of the officers and soldiers which had been specified in the aforementioned order, who accounted for about 75% of their number as identified in the posts. Throughout the restructuring of peacetime posts No 181, which started on 14 September 1939, the 5th BPB was not increased in size, which leads to the conclusion that no more serious armed conflicts were expected, and the main tasks which were foreseen for the 5th BPB included the strengthening of state border protection and internment duties. The fact that the situation along the state border, which was being guarded by the 5th BPB, was not considered tense is also evidenced by the fact that soldiers would be allowed to go on leave to be able to carry out work in the fields at home. Due to the prevailing direction of mechanical warfare of the time, machine guns were considered the main weapon of infantry soldiers. In military doctrine, the heavy machine gun is referred to as the most powerful ‘infantry’ weapon, one which in some respects could replace the prevailing artillery shortage, while the light machine gun was the main weapon of the ‘modern infantry’, and the effectiveness of these weapons is evaluated as follows: ‘One well-positioned and well-functioning machine gun is often enough to stop an enemy attack and create the conditions for a counter-attack’.1 Therefore the number of machine guns should be considered the main criterion in terms of assessing the combat power of the 5th BPB.According to wartime posts No 119, the BPB was to be armed with four heavy machine guns, eighteen light machine guns, and 389 rifles. On 6 September 1939, the 5th BPB had twenty machine guns and 455 rifles, so it can be seen that the battalion was fully armed, leading to the conclusion that its combat power was sufficient for it to be able to carry out its planned combat tasks. A German surname or nationality was not a decisive factor in determining ‘credibility’. The decision to remove ‘unreliable’ individuals from the BPB could have had a political connotation at the highest level, while also helping to strengthen discipline at the divisional level, and preventing possible harm which such ‘unreliable’ people could have caused to these units which, due to a degree of latency, could have gone unnoticed in peacetime, but could eventually have caused serious problems in the case of a military conflict breaking out. However, when addressing the rather important issue of ‘reliability’ in the units of the 5th BPB, personality clashes may have been inevitable. The 5th BPB did not have any problems with service or discipline, so therefore the hasty determination of the ‘reliability’ of subordinate soldiers was entrusted to one person, something which was revealed during the study, and something which raises reasonable doubts about there being proper objectivity. [From the publication]

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