Прийняття Я. Радзивіллом у 1655 р. шведської протекції: оцінки сучасників та мотиви гетьмана
LTReikšminiai žodžiai: Jonušas Radvila; Lietuvos Didžioji Kunigaikštystė; Politinis elitas; Švedų protektoratas; Švedija; Abiejų Tautų Respublika. Keywords: Janusz Radziwill; Grand Duchy of Lithuania; Political elite; Swedish protection; Sweden; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.Reikšminiai žodžiai: Lietuvos Didžioji Kunigaikštystė (LDK; Grand Duchy of Lithuania; GDL); Abiejų Tautų Respublika (ATR; Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów; Žečpospolita; Sandrauga; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth); Jonas Radvila (Jan Radziwiłł); Valstybės veikėjai; Politikos veikėjai; 17 amžius; Etmonai; Gynyba; 17th century; Statesmen; Politicians; Hetman; Protection.
ENThe article highlights the perception and assessments of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania Janush Radziwill by contemporaries; acceptance of Swedish protection by him in 1655; as well as it clarifies the reasons for such a step by the Hetman through the prism of his own vision and understanding that difficult situation for principality and ways out of it. It is determined that after the attack of Swedish troops in the summer of 1655 on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the situation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania deteriorated sharply, as its territory was at the epicenter of the military confrontation (at the same time it was in war with Moscow state). In this situation J. Radziwill and part of the political elite considered the acceptance of Swedish protection to be an effective means for saving the principality. It is found out his step caused the accusation of contemporaries in treason both the Commonwealth and King Jan Casimir. It is found out that a good reason for the acceptance of the Swedish protection by J. Radzvill was Warsaw support absence in the face of military threat to the principality from Sweden and Muscovy, thus it was impossible to fight against them simultaneously. The factor that pushed hetman to such a step was Vilna capture by Moscow troops and the capitulation of the crown army near Uysts in late July 1655. On one hand, Lithuania's acceptance of the Swedish monarch protection threatened the integrity of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which according to the results of Lublin Union in 1569 was proclaimed a state of two components - the Crown and Lithuania. However, on the other hand as Lithuania was left alone with the military aggression of Muscovy and Sweden, it was an attempt to save the principality and strengthen its political influence. [From the publication]
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- Між Москвою та Варшавою: Вінцент Корвін-Госєвскій як образ литовської еліти в умовах російсько-польської війни 1654-1667 рр / Володимир Газін. Ukraina Lithuanica : студії з історії Великого князівства Литовського. 2015, 3, p. 160-168.
