Suvalkų sutartis – po šimto metų

LTReikšminiai žodžiai: Suvalkų sutartis; Sukaktis; Lietuvos-Lenkijos santykięai; Suvalkai trety; Anniversary; Lithuanian-Polish relations.

ENThis article briefly reviews the development of Lithuanian-Polish relations from the restoration of modern states to the annexation of the Lithuanian capital. Poland, under the advantage of its geopolitical, demographic, and military positions, sought to rebuild a powerful state by unilaterally using the outdated political reflexes of the Commonwealth, by misleading the members of the Union about the immaturity of their northern and south-eastern neighbours for state life and by using their (albeit variable) support. Poland ignored the socio-cultural and socio-political transformation that took place from the capture of the Commonwealth to the formation of modern nations in Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 20th century. It employed an annexionist and pseudo-federal model to justify the country’s expansion. Lithuania, which had restored a modern democratic state, could not accept the aggressively expressed territorial claims of Poland and the ultimatically permeated federal model of the state system. The seizure of Seinai, one of the strongest Lithuanian ethno cultural centres, in the summer of 1919, the organization of the state upheaval in Kaunas, and the occupation of Vilnius under the guise of defending against Bolshevism greatly complicated the rational decisions of relations with Poland. The new geopolitical confluence formed after Poland’s victory over Soviet Russia highlighted Poland’s political and territorial claims to Lithuania. Armed “interpretation” of relations in the autumn 1920 led to the mediation of the League of Nations in an attempt to stop Poland’s military action against Lithuania. Thus, after the unsuccessful attempts of Kaunas and Kalvarija to stop military actions, more negotiations were reached, this time in Suvalkai.The activation of the diplomatic factor with the Monitoring Commission of the League of Nations monitoring the situation at the scene of the conflict was more convenient for Lithuania with few military capabilities to stop the Polish aggression. In contrast to Poland, according to J. Pilsudskis, after the “military fortune smiled”, this conference (like the previous in Spa) restricted the possibility of open military actions against Lithuania and the direct annexation of Vilnius. The occupation of Varėna during the negotiations in Suvalkai and the non-extension of the demarcation line to the east of Bastūnai were also the signals to Lithuania and the League of Nations that Poland would not accept the situation. Delaying the negotiations, J. Pilsudskis prepared for the annexation of the Vilnius region, and not only, in the form of a “military uprising”, securing the secession of Soviet Russia and Poland in the northern part of Riga, which enabled L. Želigovskis to safely carry out military and political actions against Lithuanian integrity. It remains a symbolic superstructure of the Suvalkai Treaty. Partial establishment of the demarcation line, the main outcome of the Suvalkai Treaty signed on October 7, 1920, which was crowned by L. Želigovskis “rebellion”, became a discreditation of the pseudofederal “tool” of Polish relations, and the ambiguities of the League of Nations conditioned by the different interests of its members and, based on this, a manifestation of weakness. The Treaty of Suvalkai did not eliminate the ideological discrepancy between Lithuanian and Polish relations even a hundred years later. In 1994 a unique opportunity for the ideological balance of the relationship arose. However, in our view, it was not properly understood and appreciated by the Poles. [From the publication]