Roosevelt and the dictators: the origin of the US nonrecognition policy of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states
LTReikšminiai žodžiai: Sovietų aneksija; Baltijos valstybės; Šaltasis karas; Soviet annexation; Baltic States; Cold war.
ENAfter World War I, the United States embarked upon a course of isolationism, determined as far as possible not to become involved in any further European conflicts. As to the east Baltic region, it was thought to have no great strategic importance for Washington. Despite granting full de jure recognition to all three Baltic states by July 1922, the United States did not initiate any meaningful political or economic development with the region. Nevertheless, there were normal albeit minimal diplomatic relations between the Americans and the nascent Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The situation appeared to change fundamentally as a result of the secret protocol contained in the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, which ultimately relegated Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the Soviet sphere of influence. In the course of 1939–1940, the Soviet Union issued a series of ultimatums to the Baltic governments that eventually led to the full annexation of the states. It prompted a strong reaction from the United States and on 23 July 1940, acting US Secretary of State Sumner E. Welles issued a harshly worded condemnation of Soviet actions. This and the reaffirmation of the continued recognition of the independence of the Baltic states brought Baltic issues to the front pages of every major newspaper in the United States in 1940. It also opened one of the most puzzling and paradoxical discourses in diplomatic history. Given the ultimate fate of the Baltic states after World War II, several questions need to be asked about the policy of nonrecognition. To what extent had senior US governmental officials really supported the earlier policy? Was the Welles Declaration representative of a deliberate policy change, or merely an anomaly? Furthermore, was the policy strictly intended for a domestic audience in an election year or was it genuinely enacted in good faith to the international community?. [Extract, p. 33]
