LTŠiuolaikinėje filosofijoje gyvūno klausimas svarstomas ir atskleidžiamas labai skirtingais būdais. Jorge Luisas Borgesas yra pasiūlęs tokią tariamą gyvūnų klasifikaciją: gyvūnus jis skirstė į tuos, kuriuos valgome; tuos, kurių bijome, ir tuos, su kuriais žiūrime televizorių. Suprantama, kad tokio skirstymo pamatas yra senasis gerasis antropocentrizmas. Matthew Calarcas knygoje Mąstyti su gyvūnais: tapatybė, skirtumas, neapibrėžtumas išskiria tris dominuojančias mąstymo apie gyvūnus tendencijas. Pirmoji tendencija - tai vadinamasis egalitarinis modelis, numatantis visų gyvų būtybių lygiavertiškumą. Šiuo modeliu besiremiantys teoretikai - Peteris Singeris, Tomas Reganas, Paola Cavalieri - mano, jog tiek žmogiški, tiek nežmogiški gyvūnai yra lygiaverčiai „gyvybės subjektai", todėl su jais turi būti elgiamasi vienodai. Būtent šis gyvybės tęstinumas leidžia manyti, jog žmogaus teisės gali būti perkeliamos gyvūnams. Geriausias tokio perkėlimo pavyzdys - Žmoginių beždžionių projektas, kurio tikslas yra išplėsti lygiaverčių subjektų bendruomenę, į ją įtraukiant visas žmogines beždžiones: žmones, šimpanzes, gorilas ir orangutanus. Tačiau šis egalitarizmu grįstas modelis neatsižvelgia į kitų, nepanašių į žmogų, gyvūnų teises. Tokiu būdu egalitarinis modelis netik nepadeda išsivaduoti iš antropocentrizmo, bet tam tikru būdu jį išplečia ir sustiprina, suteikdamas žmogaus teises į žmogų panašiems gyvūnams. Deja, daugelio kitų gyvūnų rūšių, taip pat ir žmonių, neatitinkančių egalitarinės vaizduotės modelio, egzistencija lieka pažeidžiama ir atsitiktinė. [Iš straipsnio, p. 217]
ENNewly emerging trends of thought, such as the increasingly vigorous discussion about the definition of the Anthropocene, force us to reconsider the nature of man and his place vis-ä-vis other living creatures. The entire history of classical philosophy, from Aristotle to Martin Heidegger, is founded on the distinction between the human and the non-human, or animal, world. Giorgio Agamben asserted that man can only be human to the extent that he surpasses and transforms animals, in so far as he is able to master, suppress or deny his own animal nature. In this view, the modern era functions like a great anthropological machine, which works by animalization of humans, and by humanization of an animals. The anthropological machine functions by creating a division within man itself and separating suitable citizens from those who are viewed as being too similar to animals - Jews, refugees, comatose patients. This animalization of humans transpires alongside contradicting trends, such as the humanization of animals, as humans seek to expand their community by ennobling certain kinds of animals and conferring upon them certain human rights. In contemporary philosophy, the animal question is debated and revealed in very different ways. In his book Thinking Through Animals: Identity, Difference, Indistinction, Matthew Calarco singles out three prevailing trends of thought about animals. The first trend, represented by Peter Singer, Tom Regan and Paola Cavalieri, is based on the so-called egalitarian model, which embraces equality for all living creatures. This equality of life suggests that human rights can, in fact, be transferred to certain animals, as in the case of great apes, for example.The second way of thinking about animals, embraced by Jacques Derrida, is founded on the belief that there is no universal "human" nor universal "animal" - there is only a multitude of different singularities. The third trend, based on texts by Gilles Deleuze, Giorgio Agamben and Donna J. Haraway, emphasizes the continuity of, and even indistinction between, the multifaceted forms taken by humans and animals. The theoreticians embracing this view believe that it is not sufficient to multiply the differences and divisions between human and non-human creatures - it is imperative that we understand the biological continuity that unites all forms of life. Each of these trends of thought about animals has its own unresolvable contradictions. For this reason, Derrida suggests changing the very formulation of the animal question. In his view, humans and other living creatures are connected not by the model of rights (or the power model), but, more likely, by their vulnerability and incapacity (their inability to protect themselves from pain or avoid it altogether). Thus, the foundation of a shared co-existence should not rest on the power model (realized through the privileges of rights, citizenship and property), but on the powerless-ness that marks every living creature. With such a shift in thought, we might be able to reject the anthropocentric humanist perspective and perhaps, from that moment forward, begin thinking not about, but through animals. [From the publication]