Vokietijos pavojus ir karo dviem frontais katastrofa (Lietuvos kariuomenės 1936–1937 m. operacijų planai nr. 1 „V“ ir nr. 2 „V+L“)

LTReikšminiai žodžiai: Operacijų planai; Lietuvos kariuomenė; Vokietija (Germany); Operational plan; Lithuanian Military; Germany.

ENThree operational plans for the Lithuanian armed forces were approved in 1937. One of them, operational plan No 3 ‘L’ (for Lenkija, or Poland), has already been published in the 36th volume of the series Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis. The other two plans, No 1 ‘V’ (for Vokietija, or Germany) and No 2 ‘V + L’ (for Vokietija+Lenkija, Germany+Poland) are also significant documents on Lithuanian military thought. Therefore, we have decided to publish these two plans as well. The documents are valuable in several respects. First, they provide the possibility to identify and assess the operational plans of the Lithuanian armed forces in the event of a possible war with Germany, or Germany and Poland at the same time. After the approval of the plans in 1937, the Lithuanian government faced two major foreign policy crises, and had to accept ultimatums from Poland in March 1938, and from Germany a year later. In the event of a war against Lithuania launched by Germany, Poland, or both countries together, following the rejection of the ultimatums, the Lithuanian army would have acted according to these plans. Second, the documents show the attitude of the Lithuanian army towards war in the second half of the 1930s, when it already had quite a number of senior officers who had graduated from West European (primarily French, Belgian and Czechoslovakian) military academies. Third, due to the geographical location of Lithuania, in some respects, the plans may be of interest to the 21st-century army as training and analysis material. These published new defence plans were prepared in 1936 and 1937, and approved in January and February of 1937, one year before a sudden change in the geo-political situation in Eastern Europe. The change seriously affected Lithuanian security.The possibility of a simultaneous invasion by Germany and the USSR was considered to be a catastrophe for Lithuania, leading to one of the following results: 1) a short conventional war; 2) a long guerrilla war without any great powers as allies; or 3) capitulation. Nevertheless, the operational plans of the Lithuanian armed forces, No 1 and No 2, and No 3 ‘L’, remained relevant, only the latter was changed to ‘R’. Preparations for a possible war with Germany began in Lithuania in 1935. The main reasons were the conflict over the Memel Territory (the Klaipėda region), and the increasingly aggressive rhetoric and foreign policy of Nazi Germany. At the same time, the possibility that Germany and Poland would agree to divide Eastern Europe into spheres of influence was also considered. The result of these considerations was the operational plan No 2 ‘V+L’. This can also be seen as a response to a possible war between Poland and Germany, in which Lithuania would become involved against its will. In such a war, Lithuania would not be the object of the attack, but an area of manoeuvre, like Belgium in 1914 at the beginning of the First World War. An analysis of the operational plans (and the statutes of the Lithuanian armed forces) makes it possible to understand the methods of warfare adopted by the Lithuanian army in the 1930s at operational and tactical levels. The regular army planned to take action by stopping the enemy in wide stretches, defending itself along the line along the main rivers (the Dubysa, Nevėžis, Šventoji, Nemunas and Neris). Mobile warfare was planned, whereas positional warfare war was rejected as impossible, due to the topographical conditions. In all cases, depending on the direction of the enemy attack, the main force was to concentrate east of the River Dubysa, west of the River Šventoji, and north of Kaunas, before retreating towards Latvia.One of the key factors in the success of the military operations was considered to be speed, the ability to mobilise and concentrate quickly. What was new in these plans was that the Lithuanian army introduced ‘stopping battles’, alongside offensive tactics, defensive tactics and withdrawal. This was in line with the theories implemented in the French and German armies, which were taken up and applied by the Lithuanian military. [From the publication]

• Lietuvos kariuomenės lygmens ryšių vienetai 1935-1940 m / Edvardas Vasiliauskas. Karo archyvas. 2022, 37, p. 91-157.
• Žemaitijos-Kuršo karinis gynybinis placdarmas: XX a. pirmosios pusės patirtys / Vytautas Jokubauskas, Nedas Ignatavičius, Titas Tamkvaitis. Istorija. 2021, Nr. 121, p. 94-142.