LTReikšminiai žodžiai: Lietuvos ir Rusijos santykiai; Tarptautinių santykių pripažinimo teorija; Lithuanian-Russian relations; Theory of recognition in international relations.
ENIn Europe, there are two approaches to Russia. You can conditionally call them the “critical” and the “pragmatic”. The latter approach has more supporters than the former. This is also confirmed by the statements of politicians and academic studies. The most recent example of such a division is a Decision of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 26 June 2019 to return the voting right to Russia. At that time, delegations from most European national parliaments were in favour of such a proposal, specifically following a “pragmatic” approach, while “critical” delegations from Ukraine, the Baltic states, Poland and Slovakia remained in the minority (Erlanger, 2019). Thus, Lithuania officially takes a “critical” attitude towards Russia. Compared to other European Union member states, Lithuania even belongs to the category of the strictest “critics” of Russia. At such a political attitude, such a decision seems quite fundamental. In this respect, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 did not bring anything new, meant no turns, just further consolidated this position, giving its supporters new strong arguments. On the other hand, in the sense of the “Russian issue” (foreign policy actions), it still remains “open”. This is confirmed not only by the retention of Lithuania and several other states in the minority of the Council of Europe, but also by the internal political context. Lithuanian Prime Minister Saulius Skvernelis also called for a “more pragmatic” relationship with Russia in his time, following the initiative to resume the work of the Russian-Lithuanian Intergovernmental Commission (Grytėnas, 2018). Finally, it is no secret that public opinion is in favour of the idea of “better relations” with Russia (Krupavičius, 2018). [From the publication]