Kierkegaardas: stovėsena nieko akivaizdoje

LTŠiame straipsnyje, pasitelkiant metaforišką Soreno Kierkegaardo fi- losofemą „stovėsena niekio akivaizdoje“, nužymint įvairias jos konotacijas, siekiama pažvelgti į danų mąstytoją kaip vieną reikšmingiausių Vakarų filosofinės minties reformatorių. Gvildenant neklasikinei filosofijai būdingą atsiribojimą nuo racionalistinės tradicijos kategorijų, išryškinamas aptariamos filosofemos situatyvumas, atskleidžiamas konkretus kontekstinis jos prasmių laukas. Kita vertus, tekste pasineriama ir į giminingą problematiką, vienaip ar kitaip nusakančią minėtos kategorijos išskirtinumą danų mąstytojo įdėjų kontekste. [Iš straipsnio, p. 185]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Absurdas; Aistra; Auka; Kierkegaardas; Kierkegaardas,Sorenas; Neklasikinis mąstymas; Niekis; Nietzsche; Nietzsche, Friedrichas; Paradoksas; Tikėjimas; Absurdity; Faith; Faith, absurd. passion; Kierkegaard; Kierkegaard,Soren; Nietzsche; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Non-classical thinking; Nothingness; Paradox; Passion; Sacrifice.

ENThis article tries to characterize the significant philosophical rank of Kierkegaard - a stand in the presence of trifle and discusses its congeneric topic which outlines the oneness of “religious knight” situation in one way or another. The stand in the presence of a trifle is interpreted as self-devotion to the power of paradox, it is explained not by the means of conceptual thinking, but is opened as an authentic individual experience. It closes the “put-to-experience” object in its span, rendering the non-mediational, rationally improvable and externally unverifiable form of faith. The stand is a ceaseless process, which requires constant endeavour of the “put-to-experience” object. This endeavour proves and regenerates its direction. This is a two-way process: individual effort of faith receives the final confirmation only in the act of divine lightness. Until the mentioned confirmation comes, such direction hides uncertainty and risk to follow not divine but demonic requirements, which express the power of insanity or misdeed. The torture of uncertainty like a necessary presumption of faith sets the foundation of a believer s sacrifice: the believer is pushed into the clash of contradictory requirements and he is torn apart into pieces until the last moment. Such clash is possible only when the believer follows controversial attitudes: common sense and passion of faith. None of these values can prevail absolutely, otherwise the believer would lose his source of torture. Both common sense and faith remain powerful in the person of the “religious knight”: non-mediational experience is reflex-like from the viewpoint of the “put-to-experience” person. Even on the contrary: re- flex-like conception of the situation and thereof emerging doubt is necessary for the sacrifice of faith.In the span of a paradox the believer follows such cognitive tactics, which is identical neither to reflex-like thought, nor to immediate sensitiveness. It is called the passion of faith. The passion of faith is the passion to exist in another way. This is the objective of ontological experience, but not psychological. Faith is selfchanging form of individual existence, which crosses the limits of termi- nativeness and stands in confrontation with infinity. More, such passion not only lifts up the believer above the termina- tiveness, but by the same motion terminativeness is returned to the individual in the purest, most genuine shape. The motion of faith is the motion of institution, because it provides the particular individual with what he hadn’t got before. It is also the opening, because it opens “it”, what is not created by a human being, furthermore it participates as the other side of faiths relation - the absolute. [From the publication p. 321-322]