Tarptautinės jūrų teisės aspektai Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismo praktikoje "inter alia Medvedyev ir kitų prieš Prancūziją" [DK] byloje

LTStraipsnyje analizuojamos Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismo bylos, kuriose Teismas, spręsdamas galimus 1950 m. Žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių apsaugos konvencijoje ar jos protokoluose įtvirtintų žmogaus teisų ir laisvių pažeidimus, vienu ar kitu aspektu taikė ir tarptautinės jūrų teisės normas ir principus, dar kartą pademonstruodamas, kad Konvencija taikoma ne vakuume, o atsižvelgiant ir į kitas tarptautinėje teisėje tam tikroje srityje taikomas taisykles. Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismo praktika, kurioje Teismas remiasi tarptautinės jūrų teisės normomis ir principais, nėra itin gausi. Didelis dėmesys šiame straipsnyje skiriamas Medvedyev ir kitų prieš Prancūziją Didžiosios kolegijos byloje (peticijos Nr. 3394/03) priimto sprendimo analizei, ir ypač plečiamam valstybės jurisdikcijos aiškinimui pagal minėtos Konvencijos 1 straipsnį. Taip pat straipsnyje nagrinėjamos ir kitos trys Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismo bylos, kuriose Teismas sprendė asmenų, ieškančių prieglobsčio, galimus žmogaus teisių pažeidimus pagal Konvenciją, vienu ar kitu aspektu pasisakydamas ir tarptautinės jūrų teisės klausimais, t. y. sprendimai bylose Hirsi Jamaa ir kiti prieš Italiją (peticijos Nr. 27765/09), Khlaifia ir kiti prieš Italiją (peticijos Nr. 16483/12) bei Kebe ir kiti prieš Ukrainą (peticijos Nr. 12552/12). [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Tarptautinė jūrų teisė; Europos žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių apsaugos konvencija (European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms); Valstybės jurisdikcijos samprata; Asmens teisė ieškoti prieglobsčio kitoje valstybėje; International maritime law; European Convention on Human Rights; Jurisdiction of the State; Right of person to seek refugee status in another State.

ENIn this Article the Author is analysing the judgments adopted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the European Court) in which the Court has relied upon the general principles and norms of International Law including International Maritime Law when examining the individual petitions submitted under Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Reliance on the general principles and norms of inter alia International Maritime Law demonstrates the classical legal standing of the ECtHR concerning the interpretation of the Convention norms - the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum; it has to be interpreted in the light of the rules set out in the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties, Article 31 (3) (c), which indicates that account is to be taken of “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” (see, as example, Cudak v. Lithuania, GC, appl. No. 15869/02, judgment of 23 March 2010, para. 56). Therefore, the relevant principles and norms of inter alia International Maritime Law should also be taken into account by the ECtHR when dealing with some specific individai petitions. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights demonstrating references to the general principles and norms of International Maritime Law is not very abundant. The Author of this Article, relying on her subjective opinion, is trying to identify such cases and analyse them in the Article.The first identified case in this respect is the Grand Chamber case "Medvedyev and Others v. France" (appl. No. 3394/03), where the ECtHR had broadly interpreted the principle of jurisdiction of states under Article 1 of the Convention declaring that all actions undertaken by the French authorities on the high seas in respect of the foreign vessel “The Winner” (registered in Cambodia and flying its flag), including its arrest on the high seas and deprivation of liberty of its crew members had engaged the territorial jurisdiction of France. The French naval authorities had taken the mentioned actions relying on the suspicion that this ship might be carrying large quantities of drugs. In a diplomatic note Cambodia gave its agreement for the French authorities to act. Accordingly, the French authorities had “The Winner” intercepted on the high seas off Cape Verde and escorted to the French port of Brest. When analysing the merits of the case, the ECtHR noted that in cases concerning drug-trafficking on the high seas public international law upheld the classical principle of the International Maritime Law that the flag state - in this case Cambodia - had jurisdiction in respect of the ship flying its flag. Therefore, a special reference was made to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (Montego Bay Convention), which did not provide any legal basis for the French authorities to take actions in this case. As Cambodia was not party to the Montego Bay Convention, it could not have been acting under its provisions when it sent its diplomatic note. Nor did France’s request for cooperation from the Cambodian authorities fall within the scope of that Convention. In this context, some principles and norms of International Maritime Law are of major legal importance, i. e., Article 87 the Montego Bay Convention stating the fundamental principle of freedom of the high seas, which comprises, inter alia the freedom of navigation.Article 90 of the mentioned Convention stipulates that “Every State <...>has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas”. Article 91 of the Montego Bay Convention regulates the nationality of ships and Article 92 - the status of ships. Therefore, a legal question can be raised - whether the French naval authorities were having the legal basis for arresting “The Winner” flying the flag of Cambodia on the high seas and, whether such actions by France can be regarded as interference with the right of free navigation on the high seas. These questions were not analysed by the ECtHR, as the European Court had focussed on the legal analysis of the Convention norms and applicable standards, in respect, especially of Article 1 and 5 of the ECHR. The European Court came to the conclusion that it had not been shown that there was any constant practice on the part of the States capable of establishing the existence of a principle of customary international law generally authorising the intervention of any State which had reasonable grounds for believing that a ship flying the flag of another State (and on the high seas) was engaged in illicit traffic in drugs. When a flag state, like Cambodia in this case, was not a party to the Montego Bay or Vienna Conventions (see paras. 27-33 of the Judgment), the insufficiency of such legal instruments, for the regional or bilateral initiatives, was of no real consequence. Therefore, for the Convention purposes, only a narrow interpretation was consistent with the aim of Article 5 (1) of the Convention. [Extract, p. 332-334]