Netiesioginis poveikis ir Lietuvos karinis saugumas 1919-1940 m.

LTKaras - tai permanentinis ir įvairiomis formomis pasireiškiantis fenomenas. Visuomenės ir akademinės bendruomenės dažniausiai į karą atkreipiamas dėmesys, kai jis visuomenę paliečia pačia brutaliausia savo forma - smurtu. Karas ne visada būna sankcionuotas, nes dažnai konvencinius karo veiksmus lydi de jure nesankcionuoti smurtiniai veiksmai, o neretai ir gaivališkas marodieriavimas. Pagaliau atvirus karo veiksmus dažnai lydi visas kompleksas socialinių ir ekonominių problemų bei iššūkių. Karas - klastingas reiškinys, nes ir kariaujama taikos metu. Ši knyga - tiek apie įprastas, atviras kariavimo formas, tiek apie tai, ką nemaža dalis visuomenės nėra linkusi laikyti karu. Bet tikimės, kad šiuo tyrimu prisidėsime prie karo sampratos praplėtimo ir supratimo, kad kovą pralaimėti galima dar karui neprasidėjus. [Iš Pratarmės]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Istorija; Krašto apsauga; Karinis saugumas; Nacionalinis saugumas; Kariuomenė; Karas; Lithuania; History; National defence; Military security; National security; Army; War.

ENCaptain B. H. Liddell Hart, a military theorist of the twentieth century, started to formulate his concept of the strategy of indirect approach based on the analysis of military history, which was summarized in the study of warfare theory published in 1941 and reprinted in an enlarged edition of 1954. According to B. H. Liddell Hart, an indirect approach is an essence of the strategy because of its advantages over direct military action. The goal of an indirect approach is the dislocation of the enemy's forces before attempting to defeat him. Thus, the indirect approach can be defined as a whole of applicable measures that can be used in peace and at war while avoiding a costly direct frontal assault. In the interwar period, the state of Lithuania had to face a wide range of threats to its nationhood that were directed against Lithuania by eventual enemies in a full-scale manner. In its turn, Lithuania also applied measures of the indirect approach seeking to defend its statehood and strategic interests. Territorial losses and Soviet occupation resulted neither from military defeats nor a poor preparation by the armed forces for an armed resistance; indeed, it was an outcome of an effective use of the strategy of indirect approach by the aggressors. The monograph provides an analysis of how a symbiosis of conventional and unconventional warfare methods can be and have been effectively used at different stages of the war and confrontation. The interwar period saw the application of an indirect approach with the use of both conventional and unconventional methods. The research has been done based on the case study of Lithuania in the interwar period using methodological approach of the strategy of indirect approach with its adaptation to the conditions of a small state in the first half of the twentieth century.Taking into consideration the above-mentioned warfare concepts, the research into military history of interwar Lithuania has been conducted by bringing in an analysis of the activities not only of regular forces and paramilitary organisations but also of a wide range of indirect approach, when there is no direct fighting involving armies of adversary states but a state is exposed to external attacks whereby it is sought to weaken its defence capabilities (moral, conceptual (planning), physical and material). The chronological framework of the research encompasses a period from 1918 to 1940, i.e. from active war efforts aimed at the consolidation of the independence of Lithuania to Soviet occupation and the liquidation of the Lithuanian army and paramilitary organisations. The main objective of the research is to study actions involving the strategy of indirect approach (relying on both conventional and unconventional warfare methods) used by the adjacent states (Poland, Germany and Soviet Russia (USSR)) targeted against Lithuania, and their impact on the loss of Vilnius and Klaipėda regions and the loss of statehood in 1940, and the capability to apply the strategy of indirect approach by the Lithuanian state. The aims of the research include an analysis of the cases of using the strategy of indirect approach through the use of conventional weapons; an examination of the impact on the Lithuanian society exerted by social and economic problems; a study of the activities of the national minorities and the Communist underground as well as pro-German individuals directed against Lithuania; and the identification and assessment of military solutions undertaken by the Lithuanian state in the late 1930s when the inevitability of war and incapacity of a direct resistance under conditions of conventional war came to be realised.The results of the research conducted from several perspectives have been summarized in the monograph consisting of three chapters: the first chapter deals with four cases (combats against the West Russian Volunteer Army in 1919, fighting against "insurrectionist” Polish units led by L. Żeligowski in 1920, the Lithuanian orchestrated Klaipėda "revolt" in 1923, and the annexation of the Klaipėda Region by Germany in 1939) which are significant in two aspects within the framework of this research. On the one hand, the fights for Vilnius and Klaipėda predetermine tensions in the relations with Poland and Germany in the interwar period. On the other hand, it typifies the nature of the combat with the states acting in an indirect approach. B. H. Liddell Hart gives an example from the history of Ancient Greece - the Battle of Marathon between the Athenians and the Persians which took place in 490 BC. The latter, after having landed at the coast, attempted to pull out the Athenian forces from the city so that those Athenians who remained in the city, and being in conspiracy with the Persians, might revolt and stage a coup d’etat and eventually take power, while the Persian fleet would come to their aid. The Athenians, however, not only won the fight after having engaged into action, they also managed to return to Athens and confront the Persian fleet there. The Persians, having realised that they would not be able to take the city with the aid of the Athenians dissatisfied with the authorities (a fifth column), because they would even be forced to join the battle against the Persians in the event of the Persian attack on the city, which would have necessarily resulted in an exhausting and time consuming siege, the Persians went back to Asia. This example from the ancient history shows that conventional warfare methods (a battle) make part of the strategy of indirect approach. [From the publication]