Fenomenologinė filosofija ir jos šešėlis

LTAlgio Mickūno ir Daliaus Jonkaus knyga "Fenomenologinė filosofija ir jos šešėlis" yra naujai perrašyta 1994 metais "Baltų lankų" leidyklos išleistos knygos "Fenomenologinė filosofija" (autoriai Algis Mickūnas ir David Stewart, iš anglų kalbos vertė Arūnas Sverdiolas) versija. Kadangi knyga buvo taisyta, o dalis parašyta naujai, tai pasikeitė ir jos autorių sudėtis bei pavadinimas. Knygą perrašyti imtasi dėl kelių priežasčių. Pirmiausia siekta atnaujinti požiūrį į pačią fenomenologinę filosofiją. Pirmoji knygos versija buvo publikuota dar 1974 metais. Tai buvo vienas pirmųjų įvadų į fenomenologinę filosofiją. Nuo to laiko pasirodė daug fenomenologijos pradininko Edmundo Husserlio tekstų, taip pat ir kritinių tyrinėjimų. Vien Husserlio skelbtų raštų apimtis per tą laiką patrigubėjo. Ką jau kalbėti apie kritinės literatūros apimtis. Todėl naujoje knygoje siekta pakoreguoti fenomenologinės filosofijos apžvalgą, taip pat pateikti kritinius šiuolaikinių filosofijos tendencijų vertinimus. Knyga išlaikė anksčiau turėtą struktūrą, tačiau atsirado trečia dalis "Patiriančio subjekto naikinimas. Fenomenologinė kritika“. Joje kritiškai analizuojamos filosofijos, siekiančios paneigti racionalaus subjekto reikiamybę. Atskleidžiama, kaip Heideggerio inicijuotas subjekto paneigimas veda prie visiško racionalumo atsisakymo ir pačios filosofijos redukavimo į teologiją arba j natūralistinius neuromokslus. Pakeitimų ir patikslinimų atsirado visuose knygos skyriuose, bet labiausiai praplėsti skyriai apie fenomenologinį metodą ir apie tradicinių problemų fenomenologinę analizę. [...]. [Iš Pratarmės]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Fenomenologija, Husserlis, hermeneutika, postmodernizmas; Phenomenology, Husserl, Hermeneutics, Postmodernism.

ENThe text is designed to serve various audiences and their levels of interest. First, an accessible and precise exposition of fundamental philosophical-phenomenological issues affecting common understanding of the world and its various levels of objectivity, and the ways that the world and such objectivities can be accessed by awareness. While in daily life we take numerous domains of our life world as obvious, when asked to explicate such domains we tend to rely on some popular conception that is in vogue to explain anything and everything. We may use psychology, economy, corrupt politics, lack of morality, blessings and punishments by divinities, or even biology or chemistry. Phenomenology shows very precisely the "essence" of each domain, within its own precise parameters, as distinct from other domains, and thus allows for the understanding what each domain has to offer without being confused with other domains. This is the true "positivism" of phenomenology insofar as it avoids all prejudgments that might be irrelevant to one or another discipline. This is to say, physics is a discipline and can be investigated for what it is, just as logic can be investigated in its own right without bringing in prejudgments from physics. Second, it will serve well persons who are interested to follow the transcendental debates between phenomenology and other trends of philosophy, including positivism and, most recent challenges to phenomenology stemming from various "post modern" trends. Obviously, there is no such thesis as "post modern philosophy" since every essayist has a distinct style and story line, yet what is common among them are the passionate efforts to reject the "subject". While the text is based on phenomenological tradition, it is also an exposition of phenomenological philosophy opened by strict philosophical arguments concerning the most basic issues of philosophy across the Western tradition.Before engaging in an analyses of a given field or phenomena, Husserl presented strict arguments to show that various positions, attempting to explain everything in terms of their own postulated principles, lead to absurdities and even contradictions. Thus to say that there are no "essences" is to make an essential claim. In this sense, the text comprises a contribution to philosophy in the best sense of the word: love of wisdom. Indeed, Husserl insists that he is returning the West to genuine, classical philosophy. Third, the text articulates the phenomenological method in depth and reveals the ways that other philosophies, despite their opposition to phenomenology must, in principle, accept such a method in order to present their philosophical claims. This means that whether it is positivism, empiricism, and even rationalism, each must perform a phenomenological "bracketing" or exclusion of theses that are not part of the prejudgments of such philosophical directions. No doubt, such exclusion admits that other domains of awareness are present, but can be "reduced" to the requirements or postulates of such directions. For phenomenology, such excluded domains are equally present and require specific investigations that, to speak methodologically, must place in brackets the claims of other directions to be all encompassing. Thus if empiricism claims that all phenomena, except for the empirical, must be excluded, it is the task of phenomenology to demonstrate that the excluded phenomena, such as logic, is not only present, but is equally employed by empiricists in their arguments against other directions, and thus is accepted, requiring phenomenological investigations into the structure of awareness required to access logic. This means that the empirical phenomena must be placed "in brackets" so that the access to pure logic would not be hindered.Of course, the empirical phenomena do not cease to be present, but they comprise a distinct domain for phenomenological investigation, requiring, for methodological purposes, the bracketing of logic. The same can be said of other fields, such as psychology, concerned with the specific phenomena of emotions, dreams, desires, and wishes. In order to access these phenomena, the empirical and the logical must be placed in brackets so that they would not impose their structures on the psychological domain. Fourth, the text also addresses specific disciplines and their essential, that is "eidetic" morphologies - their invariant features regardless of their historical contingencies. At the outset it is to be insisted that this does not mean that phenomenology becomes "applied" on such areas or even disciplines doing research in such areas. If we take "sociology" as a way of explaining social phenomena, phenomenology will take both, the discipline of sociology and its various constructs, and the social phenomena as given in order to disclose the essential features both of social theories and social phenomena - without adding anything from phenomenology as some sort of theoretical blanket. Yet primary concern is not with social theory but with social phenomena and the ways that such phenomena are composed in terms of categories, hierarchies, inter-subjective relationships, and even value differentiations. The same procedures are relevant for disclosing phenomena of a particular area of a life world. The aesthetic awareness that is required to access numerous cultural creations, from painting, literature, music, theatre and dance, each requiring careful analyses of what makes each art form present to awareness in its own composition, without reducing such arts to one or another kind of psychological explanation. [...]. [From the publication]