Atmintis religijos filosofijoje: dekartiškojo demono gundymai epistemologijoje ir teodicėjoje

LTAnalizuojama atminties refleksija religijos filosofijoje. Probleminį lauką apibrėžia Descartes’as, mintiniame eksperimente postuluojantis visagalį blogio demoną, galintį falsifikuoti žmogišką suvokimą. Iškelta solipsizmo problema numato abejonę ir atmintimi paremtais teiginiais. Descartes’o prielaidas konstruktyviai naudoja A. Plantinga spręsdamas religijos epistemologijos problemas, visų pirma naujai keldamas klausimą, ar tikėjimas Dievu yra racionalus ir, jei taip, ar pagrįstas? P. Inwagenas, savo ruožtu, pasitelkia atminties analizę konstruodamas teodicėją paremiančius argumentus. Atsižvelgiant į aptariamą problematiką, neišvengiamai iškyla ir tokios religijos filosofijos temos, kaip pomirtinis gyvenimas, sielos egzistavimas, glaudžiai susijusios su asmens tapatybės analize. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Atmintis; Įsitikinimas; Teodicėja; Blogis; Asmens tapatybė; Memory; Belief; Theodicy; Evil; Personal identity.

ENArticle deals with the reflection of memory in the fields of philosophy of religion, especially epistemological strategies of Alvin Plantinga and theodicy presented by Peter van Inwagen. They both followed the warning of Descartes about the possibility of the almighty spirit evil or daemon deceiver and accepted it as a reminding about the fallibility of memory. Plantinga while asking if belief in God is rationally acceptable examines the tradition of foundationalism in which some beliefs are taken to be basic (obvious) and some are not (for example, belief in God). Further he argues that the basic beliefs of classical foundationalism (including memory beliefs) are in turn grounded upon some experiential contexts which consist of more concrete and specific propositions. If so, then the belief in God can be regarded as rationally acceptable, because it is grounded on those existential contexts which consist of true-life propositions and are properly basic. Peter van Inwagen uses analysis of memory to show that the disrooting of the evil of this world is logically acceptable only with the condition that God momentarily cancels all memories of those evils, which in turn is deceiving and, following the definition of Descartes, impossible.Yet the further and more important conclusion which Inwagen draws is that deceived memory (human being) looses the possibility of free and conscious choice in the presence of evil, in short, he lives in the world of illusions. Finally, the absence of memories of evil experienced and made during the existence violates the necessary condition of the final stage of God’s plan of atonement. Otherwise we can imagine the second, third etc. Fall. At the end, a brief discussion on memory and analysis of naturally related themes such as personal identity, afterlife and existence of the soul is offered. [From the publication]