Oficialios administracinės doktrinos reikšmė konstitucinei normų patikrai ir oficialiai konstitucinei doktrinai

ENThe Lithuanian legal science has not so far thoroughly considered the issue of whether the Constitutional Court is empowered under the Constitution to be not only an interpreter of the Constitution, but also such a “sovereign” interpreter of laws (as well as other acts) passed by the Seimas, decrees of the President of the Republic or government resolutions, which is not bound by the doctrine of administrative courts (or those of general jurisdiction) on the concept of the content of such laws, decrees or resolutions. It is possible both to justify and to criticise the fact that acts of the Constitutional Court do not normally indicate (directly) the administrative doctrine formed by the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania. The Constitutional Court (as such), separated from the courts applying to it, does not constitute an independent system of justice. The administrative doctrine created by administrative courts is very significant for the constitutional verification of norms and should more be used (reflected) in the Constitutional Court’s rulings. One should take into consideration the fact that the official administrative jurisprudence is created not only by the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania that considers administrative cases, but also by the Constitutional Court. The latter does so when, in constitutional justice cases, it performs the construction of the provisions of a particular (investigated or parallel) law or legal act of lower legal force categorised as belonging to the system of administrative law. If this is done on the grounds (in the context) of provisions of the Constitution, a mixed (dualistic) constitutional-administrative doctrine is formed. It is correspondingly (but not necessarily unconditionally) binding on courts.Only such interpretations formulated by the Constitutional Court should be binding without reservations on administrative courts and courts of general jurisdiction, which contain a statement that a different understanding of the legal regulation (to a certain extent) would mean the conflict of the law, consolidating (including) such a regulation, with the Constitution (so-called “constitutionally comfortable” interpretations of laws). In the context of a dialogue between courts, the journalistic and political science criticism regarding their arguments, i.e., quasi-jurisprudence, is correspondingly important. Even though, from the point of view of methodology, it is chaotic and, therefore, may not be an alternative to the judicial jurisprudence, however, it could be related (compared) with the critical studies of legal scientists, thus, it should not categorically be rejected (depreciated) as devoid of any conceptual value or as posing a threat to courts. A wider political-legal discourse could be significant for the particularisation (development) of the constitutional and administrative doctrine. [From the publication]