ENThis article provides an overview of the military aspects of the war of 1259-1260, which took place between the Teutonic Order, its conquered nations and allies on one side and the pagan armies represented by the Samogitians on the other, culminating in the Battle of Durbė. The research used standard methods for military events, especially focusing on the ideological peculiarities, the theatre of war, attempts to localise the Castle of St George, the movement routes of the armed forces, the sizes and qualitative characteristics of the armies and attempts to calculate the balance of power. The research also attempted to use the scarce knowledge to provide a picture of the commanders’ personal qualities, knowledge about the enemy and preliminary plans. The analysis of the battle tries to answer the question on how and why battle ended in a certain way, and which factors determined the victory or defeat. The majority of these issues were raised for the first time, thus enabling new assumptions and a critical assessment of the context of the second half of the 13th c. and turning the events hidden in the past into calculations of the balance of power and identification of military effects, as well as to take a look at the battle as a battlefield of ideas, measures and people. The research showed that the use of standard methods to analyse a 13th c. military event was successful and useful.The victory was achieved because of a unified ideology, coordinated action, successful strategy of focusing the main strike to the enemy territory (the strategy of indirect actions) and because a part of the enemy armed forces deserted or joined the pagan side. The defeat was determined by ideological and military reasons. The desire for bounty outweighed the necessity to apply a unified Christian ideology and some of the neophytes completely lost their motivation to fight. Samogitians managed to create an alternative for the Christian ideology, which not only consolidated the pagan forces, but also divided the Christian forces. From the strategic perspective the Order was too hasty with its conquest, the thirst for honour and glory outweighed appropriate preparations. The tactical leadership of Burkhard von Homhausen was absent and each contingent of hybrid forces fought for themselves. Since the crusader tactics of one major strike ended in failure and some of the armed forces retreated, the Christian army was unable to deal with the crisis, although its core fought to the end. The victory at the Battle of Durbė was highly influenced by such factors as initiative, security of operations, the element of surprise, economy of forces, cooperation of policy and military efforts, as well as domination in ideology and the principles of war. [From the publication]