Neįvykęs Lietuvos komunistų valymas 1944-1946 metais?

LTReikšminiai žodžiai: Pokaris; Sovietizacija; Ideologija; Komunistų partija; After-war period; Sovietisation; Ideology; Communist party.

ENThe article deals with the phenomenon of party purges in the Soviet Union as well as the possibility of employing such punishment for Lithuanian communists. Former nomenklatura activists like to stress that they did not implement Moscow directives; they found ways how to avoid them. Besides, although Moscow often engaged in faultfinding, however, there were no party purges in Lithuania, and Antanas Sniečkus held the post of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the LCP about thirty three-years. However, archival material showed that a purge could have taken place and the Lithuanian Communist Party often experienced shock. The question how and why the Soviet Lithuanian administration avoided purges, while neither Estonia nor Latvia managed to do so. Analysis of sources and historiographic material showed that the LCP was hit by the worst crises between 1944 and 1946. However, could what happened here cause a purge? Only comparative analysis with the country where such a purge took place could help to give answer to this almost rhetorical question. Therefore, the most suitable model is the party elite purge in Estonia in 1950–1952. Its analysis produces a theoretical model of a purge: signals about a bad situation in the republic; reacting to those signals by Moscow inspectors; the conclusions they wrote were discussed at the All-Union Communist(B) Party Organizational or Political bureaus where critical resolutions were adopted; then it is discussed at a plenum of the republican party organisation where it is unanimously approved and at the same plenum (only it alone could “pass” formal resolutions to dismiss the republican leadership) a purge was carried out.During the first years of the second Soviet occupation the situation in Lithuania did not satisfy Moscow, which is testified by the fact that in 1944–1946 three resolutions were adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist(B) Party. In their turn they were initiated by constant signs that signalled about unreliable workers holding high posts. The situation in Lithuania during the first years of the second Soviet occupation complies with the model but the purge did not take place. The question why it was avoided raises. One of the most important reasons was the monolith nature of the local elite when Moscow did not have an alternative base for an attack, even did not have another candidate to take Sniečkus’ post. The fact that no famous Russianised Lithuanian had been sent from Moscow to Lithuania (the case of Ivan Kebin in Estonia) helped this. It was also important that the Moscow elite did not have large interests in Lithuania, as well as Sniečkus’ ability to ensure support, his determination and self-criticism, sacrificing some leading republican figures and showing loyalty to Moscow. [From the publication]

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