Teismo precedentas: kai kurie taikymo ir aiškinimo aspektai

LTStraipsnyje nagrinėjama teismo precedento taikymo ir aiškinimo metodologija. Glaustai aptarus konceptualųjį jos aspektą, analizuojami atskiri kanonai. Siekiant pateikti nešališką vaizdą, pateikiami atskirų taisyklių trūkumai, galimos grėsmės ir esminiai pranašumai. Šitaip analizuojant aptinkama, kad deramam vadovavimuisi teismų precedentais kartais gali nepakakti vien eksplicitiškai juose pateiktų teisės išaiškinimų ar bylų panašumo kriterijaus. Tarp aptariamų metodų išskirtinis dėmesys skiriamas klausimui, kaip nustatyti teismo precedente implicitiškai įtvirtinto teisinio nurodymo (normos) turinį. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Teismo precedentas; Teisės šaltiniai; Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinis teismas; Judicial precedents; Sources of law; Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania.

ENIn recent years Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania adopted several rulings related to the doctrine of judicial precedents. On their basis legal precedents were acknowledged as binding sources of law. Howeever, since then very few papers were published in regard of this issue. Lack of scholarly research in this field may result in chaotic application and interpretation of judicial precedents which leads to conclusion that there is a demand for development of the doctrine of judicial precedents in Lithuanian legal system. Respectively, main purpose of this paper is to make a contribution for the struggle with this problem by providing a few suggestions for the canons of legal reasoning with judicial precedents. Research begins with identification of primary reasons which justify the authoritatively binding power of judicial precedents. Individual separate rules of reasoning with precedents are selected from foreign legal systems based on the harm brought by their absence. Following step includes the evaluation of potential threats which may arise if these rules are legitimized. This led the author to find that application of judicial precedents when relying only on their explicitly formulated rules does not necessarily serve the purpose of equal treatment under the law. Furthermore, such practise raises serious doubts on whether it does not breach the right to a fair trial. As a part of solution the Wambaugh test, analogical reasoning and reasoning from implicit rules are introduced. Although some of those are found as insufficient when used in isolation, altogether they provide a chance to apply precedents in compliance with initially identified justifications for the doctrine of judicial precedents. [From the publication]