LTStraipsnio tikslas – išnagrinėti dvi svarbias, istoriografijoje mažai tyrinėtas sovietinio valdymo sritis, kurios greta ūkio planavimo ir didelės sprendimų priėmimo centralizacijos apibūdina pačią sovietinę sistemą. Sistemos prievartinis pobūdis, jos vidinė logika implikavo tokių kontrolės svertų kaip partinės bausmės, KGB kompromituojančios medžiagos panaudojimas „darbe su kadrais“ reikšmę. Straipsnyje taip pat aptariama visuomenėje plačiai diskutuojama korupcijos sovietmečiu ir neformalių ryšių svarba, atskleidžiama jos sisteminė, tiksliau – sisteminio nepakankamumo – kilmė. Nors neformalūs ryšiai, funkcionierių socialiniai tinklai būdingi ir kitoms politinėms–ekonominėms santvarkoms, sovietinėje sistemoje egzistavęs bausmių skyrimo neapibrėžtumas ekonominius veikėjus skatino ieškoti glaudžių ryšių su partiniais funkcionieriais. Užsimezgę neformalūs patrono (partinio funkcionieriaus) ir kliento (įmonės vadovo) santykiai iš dalies kompensavo technokrato padėties neapibrėžtumą, jam teikė tam tikrą ideologinį saugumą. Pagal Sovietų Lietuvos pavyzdį straipsnyje analizuojama partinių bausmių skyrimo, KGB veiklos bei neformalių ryšių praktika pramonės įmonėse 1965–1985 m. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Administracinis veiksmingumas; Antanas Sniečkus; KGB; Kadrai; Klientas (įmonės vadovas); Patronas (partinis funkcionierius); Socialinis statusas; Sovietinis valdymas; Sovietinė sistema; Techniniai darbuotojai; Vadovų reputacija; Administrative Effectiveness; Antanas Sniečkus; KGB; Reputation of Executives; Social Status; Soviet rule; Soviet system; Staff; Technical Personnel; The client (head of enterprise); The patron (a party functionary).
ENThe article deals with two important spheres of the Soviet rule which have been little investigated in historiography. Their existence, besides central planning and centralised decision-making define well the Soviet system. The coercive nature o f the system and its inner logic implicated the use of such control levers as the punishment of members of the Communist Party and the importance of using compromising information gathered by the KGB in the "work with the cadres". The article is also concerned with the origins of corruption and informal ties during Soviet times, which is being widely discussed by the general public. Although informal ties and social connections formed by the functionaries are also characteristic of other political-economic systems, the vague system of inflicting punishment which existed in Soviet time made the heads in the economic sector look for possibilities of establishing close ties with party functionaries. The informal relations between the patron (a party functionary) and the client (heads of enterprises) made partly up for the indefinite situation of the latter, giving them certain ideological security. The inflicting of punishment by the party on its members, the KGB activities and the practice of informal ties in industrial enterprises between 1965 and 1985 are analysed. Party punishment was imposed on the heads of e nterprises not only for economic but also for ideological offences, as well as for hiding some facts of their biography and the lack of "collective management" of the enterprise.Punishment of its members by the party which was used as an ideological tool reduced their effectiveness and interfered with rational management of the economy. It increased the friction between the government and the heads of the enterprises, which was only partly reduced by the informal ties between the party functionary and the director of the enterprise. The compromising information gathered by the KGB at industrial enterprises about its workers which was then given over to the party bosses was an important instrument. It allowed the republican authorities who were party members to keep industrial management loyal to them. [From the publication]