Aristotelio teisingumo distinkcija šiuolaikiniame teisiniame diskurse

LTStraipsnyje nagrinėjama teisės ir teisingumo santykio problema. Atsižvelgiant į vertybinio reliatyvizmo nuostatas, vyraujančias šiuolaikinėje postmodernioje visuomenėje, keliamas teisingumo, kaip teisės vertinimo kriterijaus, problemiškumo klausimas. Analizuojant šiuolaikinį teisinį diskursą siekiama nustatyti teisingumo vietą Lietuvos bei tarptautinėje teisinėje doktrinoje ir praktikoje. Analizuojant teisinį diskursą galima atskleisti teisingumo, kaip teisės principo, svarbą šiuolaikinei teisei. Teisingumo, kaip teisės principo, turinio analizė parodo vertybinio reliatyvizmo įveikimo būdus konkretinant teisingumo sampratos objektą. Teisingumo turinį teisiniame diskurse išreiškia pusiausvyros siekis, konkretinamas klasikine nuostata „atiduoti kiekvienam, kas jo“. Kiekvienam jo dalies paskirstymo ir kompensavimo kriterijus pateikia Aristotelio teisingumo distinkcija, nurodanti būtinumą atsižvelgti į socialinio elgesio formų įvairovę. Būtent ši distinkcija padėjo pagrindus šiuolaikinei teisingumo, kaip teisės principo, sampratai. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Antikinė filosofija; Teisingumas; Teisingumo distinkcija; Teisingumo samprata; Teisinis diskursas; Teisės principas; Vertybinis reliatyvizmas; Ancient phylosophy; Conception of justice; Justice; Justice distinction; Legal discourse; Principle of law; Relativism.

ENJustice is a principal of social life, implying a necessity to take into consideration not only interests of one’s own but also those of other person’s, therefore implementation thereof in the modern law system is understood as a striving to reinforce the equilibrium of interests. When defining the sphere of justice as a legal order, a normative system regulating the actions between subjects, association should with the distribution and equalisation of the goods and loads. Then, the striving for the balance of social interests may be expressed by the formula "to give everybody his due" (suum cuique tribuere). The criteria for differentiating what is to everybody theirs are provided in Aristotle’s distinction of justice. Studying the justice distinction presented by Aristotle it is asserted, that this distinction could be considered a formula in analyzing the modern conception of justice and its influence to the modern law. Using the analytic research method Aristotle discerned three main strains of iustitia legalis, iustitia commutativa and iustitia distributiva. The iustitia legalis, discerned by Aristotle is associated with the conception of legitimacy – i.e. the necessity to comply with the common requirements of the rules of behaviour. Nevertheless, Aristotle did not keep justice and legitimacy identic. For law because of its generality cannot comprise the variety of events, sometimes the exceptio to the rule – epieikeia must be applied in order not to make the law wrong. Also, the aspects of Aristotle’s part justice discerning two main forms of social behaviour, for which the requirements of justice are applied, are very important. First of all, those are the relations of equal exchange, when the attainment of justice is considered after the equality of interchange of goodies, acts, rights and duties is stated.The remuneration and the requital here can be treated both from negative and positive sides (iustitia commutativa). Nonetheless, it is obvious, that the question of the degree and scale of exchange will remain problematic. Another form is related to the sphere of the distribution of some good (iustitia distributiva). Here we can speak about various, through centuries changeable criteria of the distribution of that good – derivation, deserts, input, needs etc. In the modern law the question of distributive justice is related with the topic of social justice. [From the publication]