Lietuvos kariuomenės parengti Klaipėdos krašto gynimo planai ir realybė 1939 metais

LTStraipsnyje nagrinėjami Lietuvos kariuomenės štabo 4-ojo dešimtmečio Klaipėdos krašto ir miesto gynimo bei gynybiniai planai prieš Vokietiją, numatant jų realizavimo galimybes Lietuvos ir Vokietijos karinio konflikto atveju. Aptariama, kokiomis karinėmis pajėgomis Lietuva disponavo 1939 m., kiek iš jų buvo sutelkta Klaipėdos krašte ir pasienyje su juo, kaip jas planavo panaudoti ir kokius įvykių scenarijus numatė kariuomenės štabas. Ieškant sąsajų su karine doktrina, apžvelgiama Lietuvos karinio laivyno būklė ir jo galima reikšmė pajūrio gynybai. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Br. gen. Stasys Raštikis; Direktyva ŠADIR; Karo laivas "Prezidentas Smetona"; Karo laivas Prezidentas Smetona; Karo planai; Klaipėdos gynimo planas; Klaipėdos kraštas [Klaipeda region]; Lietuvos karinė doktrina; Lietuvos kariuomenė; Lietuvos šaulių sąjunga; Operatyvinis planas "V"; Operatyvinis planas „V"; Pasienio policija; Border police; Brigadier General Stasys Raštikis; Klaipeda Region (Memel Territory); Klaipeda defence plan; Klaipėda defence plan; Klaipėda region; Lithuanian Riflemen Union; Lithuanian armed forces; Lithuanian army; Lithuanian military doctrine; Memel territory; Operation plan V; Operational plan V; War plans; Warship Prezidentas Smetona; ŠADIR Directive.

ENIn the early 1930, with the arising threat of Germany, the Lithuanian military doctrine defined Germany as a potential aggressor, and several variants of the operational plan "V" (i.e.Vokietija 'Germany') were developed. Defence plans for Klaipeda Region and City were prepared additionally, though the first plans of such kind were drawn up by the Lithuanian Army Headquarters as early as in the 1920s. Those plans provided for the possible threat of insurrection of the local German population in Klaipeda Region; in such a case, the plan envisaged Germany's offensive by land across the Nemunas River by storming ashore at the approaches to Klaipeda Seaport. Lithuania planned to make use of its armed forces in order to stamp out the revolt only in the event of rebellion, and in the case of involvement of Germany's military forces, the Lithuanian forces were supposed to retreat to Žemaitija region and commence defensive actions, should the offensive of Germany proceed. The Lithuanian military doctrine provided for defence in the hinterland of the country by manoeuvring and retreating in the northeast direction towards Zarasai. In the event of defeat, the retreat of the remaining army and the government to Latvia or to the Soviet Union via Vilnius Region was planned. Those plans accounted for the reserved attitude towards the navy development, since in 1939, Lithuania only had a single warship Prezidentas Smetona and several border police boats.In 1939, the Lithuanian armed forces in Klaipeda Region included about 2,500 males, while the Lithuanian active army enlisted 24,529 manpower in the peacetime, and in the event of mobilization, the armed forces were to increase to 125, 433 people and be composed of 5 infantry divisions, 1 infantry brigade, 6 reserve infantry battalions, 1 reserve artillery regiment, 3 cavalry regiments, 3 reserve cavalry squadrons, 12 border guard battalions (PAB), air force, armoured cavalry unit, and other units and services. During the given period, Lithuania disposed of approximately 6,500 border policemen and policemen. At the beginning of 1940, the Lithuanian Riflemen Union included 786 units with 48, 107 combat personnel. In the event of war, the total number of the Lithuanian armed forces would have been about 150, 000-180, 000 personnel. Following the ultimatum of Germany on 22-23 March 1939, the Lithuanian army made a hasty retreat from Klaipeda Region, and the military conflict with Germany was essentially avoided, since it would have inevitably ended with the military defeat of Lithuania. The retreat from Klaipeda Region proceeded in a chaotic manner, there was a shortage of transport, lack of action coordination from the central authorities, and of time; the army, however, was the only structure to retreat in an orderly manner and take away almost all military assets. […]. [From the publication]