LTStraipsnis skirtas pensijų reformų temai, tačiau ne įvairiems reformų modeliams analizuoti, o pačios reformos būtinumui pagrįsti. Daugiausia dėmesio teikiama skirtingiems ir prieštaringiems pensijų sistemų dalyvių interesams. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad reformuoti pensijų sistemą reiškia pakeisti jos dalyvių interesus iš antagonistinių – kokie jie yra PAYG architektūroje – į kooperacinius. Kooperaciniai santykiai – asmeninių santykių, bendruomenių ar verslo forma – gali skleistis tik laisvesnėje, lankstesnėje ir mažiau politiškai paveikioje socialinės apsaugos sistemoje. Daroma išvada, kad priešingu atveju jokiomis ekonominėmis bei politinėmis priemonėmis nepavyks išvengti vidinės sistemos įtampos ir pasiekti ilgalaikį pensijų sistemos tvarumą bei socialinę vertę. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Konkurencingumas; Lūkesčiai; Pensijų reforma; Pensijų sistema; Pensijų sistemos motyvai; Tvarumas; Competitiveness; Expectations; Motives of pension system; Pension reform; Pension system; Sustainability.
ENThe article analysis motivations and expectations of pension systems’ participants. […] Today’s political decisions are predominantly influenced by economic thoughts based on experimental principles and statistical data calculations. Human motive is not considered to be essential. […] There are three groups of the pension system’s participants defined in the article: pensioners (receivers), work force and business (contributors) and politicians (decision makers). Primary interest and fair expectation of a pensioner is to receive his pension. If this is fulfilled, he wishes bigger pension, earlier retirement or similar value increase. The expectations of pensioners are reasonable from their point of view but limitless, therefore not reasonable from the society’s point of view. This conflict can be avoided only if retirement conditions are well defined. In order not to have void expectations people have to understand realistic benefits while contributing to pension system. […] Unrealistic and ever increasing expectations of pensioners, that put the pressure on politicians and public finances and ultimately ruin pension systems, are determined by PAYG structure itself. The other group of participants – working population – that supply PAYG pension systems with funds has the interest to contribute as less as possible. From the point of view of the employee, at least in Lithuania, pension contribution is hardly considered his own input in future pension because weak connection between contribution and allowance, weak trust in government, fact that contribution is paid by the employer and etc.[...] Bearing in mind the fact that contributions are obligatory and do not allow any flexibility in payment, the only reasonable interest is to minimize them. […]. Pension contribution is a substantial financial and administrative burden which brings no added value, because employee doesn’t treat it as part of his salary, but as the employers tax. For motivation purposes employer has other much more efficient tools, however can not chose between them and PAYG, because the latter is mandatory. The third interest group in pension system is the decision maker – political parties and individual politicians. It is not so obvious that their interest is to preserve PAYG running – when a big part of public finance problems are caused by it. However structural pension reforms, needed to eliminate its inner conflict, require decisions that offend short term interests of possibly big part of population. The benefits of structural reform come up in long run and are dispersed among different groups. This does not motivate politicians to introduce structural changes. The article concludes that first of all it is very important to realize interest contradictions of pension system participants as well as to stop describing public pension system as life-time income guarantee. […]. However, while public demand for social security illusion exists and it fits well with political interests, the only pragmatic trend is one propagated by Word Bank – to increase pension scheme diversification that makes PAYG pillar less dominating. It shall be gradually replaced by the schemes, where choice is established instead of obligation and individual, family or unenforced community is approached instead of statistical unit of population. [From the publication]