LTStraipsnyje nagrinėjama, kokiais atvejais dominuojančio ūkio subjekto taikoma įvairių prekių ar paslaugų susiejimo (sujungimo) praktika laikytina piktnaudžiavimu dominuojančia padėtimi ir atitinkamai Sutarties dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo 102 straipsnio pažeidimu. Autoriai atskleidžia susiejimo sampratą, nagrinėja atskiras jo rūšis, ekonominius susiejimo aspektus bei jų įtaką teisiniam susiejimo vertinimui; analizuoja bei kritiškai vertina Europos Komisijos, Europos Bendrijos bei JAV teismų praktiką, Sutarties dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo 102 straipsnio reformos pagrindinius Komisijos parengtus dokumentus ir juose suformuluotus susiejimo praktikos vertinimo principus bei kriterijus. Nagrinėjama, kokiais atvejais susiejimas gali kelti pavojų konkurencijai ir kokiais atvejais tokia praktika galėtų būti objektyviai pateisinama. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Grynasis sujungimas; Mišrusis sujungimas; Objektyvus pateisinimas; Rinkos uždarymas; Sujungimas; Susiejimas; Sutartinis susiejimas; Techninis susiejimas; Veiksmingumas; Bundling; Contractual tying; Efficiencies; Market foreclosure; Mixed bundling; Objective justification; Pure bundling; Technical tying; Tying.
ENPaper deals with the issue of tying (as well as bundling) practices which are applied by dominant undertakings and which, under certain circumstances, can be considered as abuses of a dominant position. The authors describe the concept of tying, indicate its types, and reveal its economic aspects, since all these issues have a certain impact on the legal assessment of tying practices. The authors conclude that the European Commission (the Commission) and the European Community (EC) courts have usually been too formalistic and unreasonably hostile to tying practices and have not paid due attention to the impact of tying on competition and the beneficial features of tying. Thus certain cases have frequently and rather easily been treated as abuses of a dominant position. A more realistic and effect-based approach was taken by the Commission and the courts in the Microsoft case, where certain criteria for the assessment of tying were formulated. Still, the Microsoft case reflects a rather strict attitude towards tying practices, especially in technological tie-ins.More precise criteria for the legal assessment of tying practices were presented in the Commission’s documentation for the reform of Article 82 of the EC Treaty (presently – Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) – 2005 DG Competition discussion paper and 2008 Commission’s Communication on exclusionary abuses (the Communication). Still, the authors conclude that the Commission’s established criteria for the legal assessment of tying practices including its objective justifications are not formulated precisely and are too abstract; therefore, unless properly detailed, they may be difficult to be applied in practice. The paper presents a critical analysis of the Commission’s practice and the case-law of the EC courts as well as of the Commission’s guidelines for the assessment of tying in the DG discussion paper and the Communication. The authors of the paper raise a question on the amendment of Article 102(d) of the EC Treaty and Article 9(4) of the LR Law on Competition which, in their opinion, in the context of the Commission’s practice and the case-law of the EC courts (e.g. in the Tetra Pak II case) seem rather misleading and rendering an unfound legal certainty to undertakings regarding the possible legal safety of their applied tying practices where products are tied by their nature or according to commercial usage. [From the publication]