Korupcijos klasifikacija ekonominių santykių kontekste
LTStraipsnyje analizuojamos korupcinių veikų klasifikavimo problemos ekonominių santykių kontekste. Pagrindžiamas klasifikavimo pagal rūšis tikslas, atskleidžiamas skirtumas tarp rūšies ir formos. Pabrėžiama, kad paklausos ir pasiūlos procesų reikšmė korupcijai daro juos svarbiausiu rūšiniu korupcinių santykių klasifikacijos kriterijumi. Analizuojama paklausos ir pasiūlos sąlygota korupcija. Remiantis kiekybiniu kriterijumi, paklausos sąlygoti korupciniai sandoriai skirstomi į smulkius ir stambius. Smulkieji dar skirstomi į prisitaikomuosius ir atsiperkamuosius. Pasiūlos sąlygoti korupciniai sandoriai skiriami į smulkius ir stambius, o pastarieji - į administracinius ir politinius. Pagal korupcinių santykių aprėptį organizacijoje tiriama mažos aprėpties ir sisteminė korupcija. Atsižvelgiant į organizacijos grandžių pavaldumą, aptariama horizontalioji ir vertikalioji korupcija. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Korupcija; Paklausos sąlygota korupcija; Pasiūlos sąlygota korupcija; Corruption; Corruption determined by demand; Corruption determined by supply; Corruption, corruption determined by demand.
ENThe article analyses classification of corrupt acts in the context of economic relations. The author reveals the purpose of such a classification as well as differences between the categories of sort and form of corruption. Taking into account the influence that processes of economic demand and supply exert on emergence of corrupt relationships the author distinguishes corruption determined by supply and corruption determined by demand. The corruption determined by demand emerges when public services (health protection, kindergartens) in a country are inadequate and the state regulates market of deficient services and goods (licences, quotas, permits). Subjects of corruption determined by supply are companies and state officials supplying corrupt services to the former. By the corrupt transactions of this sort companies seek to minimize costs of making of production units and therefore to change conditions for their business essentially. This is possible to attain when legislature (government) passes legal norms that are useful for certain companies only. Criterion of the value of corrupt transaction allows classification of the latter into small-scale and large-scale transactions. Demand-determined corrupt transactions are divided into adaptation-centred and dividend-centred corrupt transactions. The former manifest in spheres where it is necessary for an individual or a company to adapt to certain circumstances in order to gain comparatively inexpensive services (services of a doctor, services of a municipal official).The dividend-centred corruption manifests in cases when an individual (a company) seeks to dispose of services that are useless by their outcomes that are regulated by law and imposed by force (for example fines imposed by a policeman or a tax inspection). The author divides large-scale supply-determined corruption into administrative corruption and political corruption. The former manifests in cases when the official negotiating a transaction with the briber invokes administrative, material and financial resources of the institution that he/she represents only. In these cases interference of the hierarchically above-standing organizations or legislature is unnecessary. Political corruption determined by supply manifests in participation of political layers in corrupt transactions. Transactions of this kind can be implemented completely only after political approval is received or after special changes of legal norms have been passed. According to range of corrupt relations in organizations narrow-range and systematic corruption are distinguished. Narrow-range corruption manifests in cases when the solution of a problem that is important to the briber depends on one or a few corrupt persons only. Political corruption manifests in cases where solution of a certain problem in corrupt ways is a feature of the whole organization and different layers of organization (for example, separate departments) that take part in the process. According to subordination of layers of organization horizontal and vertical corruption are distinguished. […]. [text from author]
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