Teisinio mąstymo antinomijos

LTStraipsnyje aptariami kai kurie jurisprudencijos mąstymo būdai, sukeliantys loginius paradoksus. Tai atvejai, kai konstitucijose ar kituose teisės aktuose tų pačių žmogaus vertybių apsauga įtvirtinama tarpiškai (per žmogaus teises) ir kartu tiesiogiai, kai teisė kaip socialinis santykis tapatinama su jos objektais (biologine, socialine, psichine realybe), kai kuriamos refleksyvios sąvokos, operuojama „absoliučiomis teisėmis“, pernelyg abstrakčiomis sąvokomis, sudvejinami teisės subjektai, teisingumo vykdymo sąvokoje tapatinami bendrasis ir individualusis teisinio reguliavimo lygmenys, ignoruojama teisė kaip santykinai savarankiškas socialinių santykių reguliatorius. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Antinomija; Loginiai paradoksai; Savirefleksija; Teise kaip santykinai savarankiškas socialiniu santykiu reguliatorius; Teises kaip socialinio santykio tapatinimas su jos objektais; Teises subjektų sudvejinimas; Teisinis mąstymas; Teisė kaip santykinai savarankiškas socialinių santykių reguliatorius; Teisės kaip socialinio santykio tapatinimas su jos objektais; Teisės subjektų sudvejinimas; Tiesiogine ir tarpine žmogaus vertybiu apsauga; Tiesioginė ir tarpinė žmogaus vertybių apsauga; Žmogaus vertybės; Antinomy; Direct and provisional protection of human values; Human values; Legal thinking; Logical paradoxes; Logical paradoxes, self-reflection, direct and provisional protection of human values, human values, legal thinking, antinomy; Self-reflection.

ENThe article discusses certain ways of jurisprudence thinking, which cause logical paradoxes. These are the cases when in Constitutions or in other legal acts, the protection of adequate values of human beings is established progressively (though human rights) and at the same time directly, when the right is equated to a social relation with its objects (biological, social, psychological reality), when reflex concepts are being created and "absolute rights" are being operated, concepts too abstract, when subjects of law are being geminated and common and individual legal regulation levels are being equated in the concept of law enforcement, and when law as relatively independent regulator of social relations is being ignored. The necessity to establish the protection of human values in Constitutions not directly, but through human rights protection (progressively) rises from the equality of all subjects of law and from law as the relation of reciprocal obligations, which is based on the unity of permissions and orders and which obliges every holder of human values to recognize the same values of another person and thus restrict own behavior in their respect. In the opposite case, protection of human values would become too independent from the behavior of the holder of these values and thus would transform into a source of uncontrollable aggression.This is demonstrated by the legal problems arising after the abolishment of death penalty and entrenchment of direct protection of human life. Legal paradoxes of another type arise from used concepts that are too abstract, and their content is not revealed (e.g. the equation of constitutional legality and constitutional justice), when the solution of a legal problem is based on non-legal arguments (replacement of law as relatively independent legal regulator with economic regulators), and when the subjects of law are geminated (the issue of unborn life as a subject of law). [From the publication]