Vyriausybės įgaliojimų grąžinimo išrinkus Respublikos prezidentą konstitucinė doktrina : kai kurie argumentavimo aspektai

LTStraipsnyje analizuojama Konstitucinio Teismo aktuose suformuota Vyriausybės įgaliojimų grąžinimo išrinkus Respublikos Prezidentą oficiali konstitucinė doktrina. Nagrinėjamos Konstitucijos nuostatos, kuriomis Konstitucinis Teismas grindžia šią doktriną. Konstatuojama, jog Konstitucijoje įtvirtintas teisinis reguliavimas, susijęs su Vyriausybės įgaliojimų grąžinimu išrinkus Respublikos Prezidentą, nėra išsamus ir visiškai aiškus, todėl jis gali būti aiškinamas nevienodai. Analizuojami argumentai, kuriais Konstitucinis Teismas grindė Vyriausybės įgaliojimų grąžinimo išrinkus Respublikos Prezidentą oficialią konstitucinę doktriną; tai argumentai, susiję su nepasitikėjimo Ministru Pirmininku pareiškimu ir su Konstitucijos 101 straipsnio 1 dalyje numatytu Vyriausybės įgaliojimų iš naujo gavimu (kai pasikeičia daugiau kaip pusė ministrų). Bandoma parodyti, kad kai kurie argumentai, kuriais yra grindžiama minėta doktrina, gali būti laikomi diskutuotinais. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Vyriausybės įgaliojimai; Konstitucija; Konstitucinis Teismas; The powers of the Government; The Constitution; The Constitutional Court; Vyriausybės įgaliojimų grąžinimas; Atsistatydinimas; Prezidentas; Returning of powers; Resignantion; President; Constitution; Constitutional Court.

ENThe article deals with the doctrine of the returning of the powers of the Government upon the election of the President of the Republic formulated in the Constitutional Court ruling of 10 January 1998. Attention is focused on the arguments of the Constitutional Court upon which this doctrine is based–these are the arguments regarding the expression of no-confidence in the Prime Minister and the new empowerment of the Government. The constitutional regulation regarding the returning of the powers of the Government upon the election of the President of the Republic is inexhaustive and unclear. [...] The Constitution provides that after the elections of the Seimas the Government must return its powers to the President of the Republic and must resign, whereas the Constitution does not provide that the Government must resign after the elections of the President of the Republic as well. The fact that the Constitution does not provide that the Government must resign after elections of the President of the Republic allows to make several assumptions regarding the legal situation which occurs after the President of the Republic is elected. One of the assumptions: even though the wording of some provisions that are entrenched in the Constitution and must be implemented after the elections of the Seimas is the same as the wording of the provisions that must be implemented after the elections of the President of the Republic, they may not be construed as leading to a conclusion that the Government must resign after the election of the President of the Republic as well. [...].Another assumption is the following: the Constitution also presumes such a legal situation, when the provisions entrenched in the Constitution regarding the formation of the Government after the President of the Republic is elected and the empowerment of the Government may be implemented only under certain conditions. The statement “in case the Seimas does not approve the candidature of the Prime Minister of the Government which has returned its powers, the Government must resign” of the Constitutional Court is related to the institute of the expression of no-confidence in the Prime Minister entrenched in the Constitution. [...] The statement “the Government is anew empowered to exercise its functions, unless more than half of the ministers have been changed” of the Constitutional Court is also considered debatable. The condition “unless more than half of the ministers have been changed” is not identical with the condition “when more than half of the Ministers are changed” established in Paragraph 2 of Article 101 of the Constitution. If more than half of the ministers are not changed in the Government, the institute of the empowerment of the Government anew may not be applied at all. The said statement of the Constitutional Court ruling is considered debatable also due to the fact that it leads to an assumption that the President of the Republic can grant the Government the powers to act as well - the President of the Republic can do so by approving a Government in which more than a half of the ministers have not been changed.In the opinion of the author, the Constitution does not grant the right to the President of the Republic, either explicitly or implicitly, to decide whether to grant anew the powers to the Government to act. Under the Constitution, it is only the prerogative of the Seimas exercised when deciding whether to approve of the programme of the Government (Paragraph 1 of Article 92). It is maintained in the article that the doctrine of the returning of the powers of the Government upon the election of the President of the Republic formulated by the Constitutional Court is one of the several possible proper variants of the construction of the Constitution. Such construction of the provisions of the Constitution is based on the principled provision that the list of the bases for the resignation of the Government established in the Constitution is final, and that the Constitution does not provide for the resignation of the Government after the returning of its powers upon the election of the President of the Republic. [From the publication]