LTKGB kovai su vidaus opozicija nuo VI deš. pasitelkė psichologinio poveikio priemones. Viena jų - asmenų ir organizacijų kompromitavimas. Sovietinėje Lietuvoje KGB kompromituojančia informacija laikė žmogaus veiklą nepriklausomoje Lietuvoje, nacių okupacijos laikotarpiu ir visa, kas KGB požiūriu žmogų darė įtartinu ir nepatikimu. KGB, kompromituodamas valdžios oponentus, siekė ne tik juos apšmeižti, spausti, slopinti jų veiklą, bet ir paveikti visuomenę, kad ši atsiribotų nuo jų ir jų id.jų. Daugiausia kompromituoti Katalikų bažnyčia, neleidusi valdžiai užvaldyti žmogaus sąmonės ir iki galo suformuoti "homo sovieticus" bei išeivijos organizacijos Santara-Šviesa ir VLIK, kėlusios Lietuvos okupacijos klausimą, bet ir skatinusios lietuvių antisovietinį, žmogaus teisių gynimo judėjimus. Išskiriamos kelios kompromitavimo formos - melo ir šmeižto kampanijos, KGB inicijuoti laiškai ir peticijos, politinių bylų kriminalizavimas ir psichiatrijos naudojimas. Kiekviena iš jų savaip siekė diskredituoti antisovietinį judėjimą, bet jas siejo bendras motyvas - depolitizuoti antisovietines akcijas, iškraipant jų tikrąją prasmę ir tikslus, suteikiant joms kitą turinį. Kompromitavimo metodas nebuvo pakankamai veiksmingas, nes nepasiekė svarbiausio tikslo - neprivertė žmonių nutraukti antisovietinę veiklą. Bet buvo apjuodintas kai kurių asmenų geras vardas, sukelta trintis tarp organizacijų, tarpusavio nepasitikėjimas.Reikšminiai žodžiai: KGB Lietuvoje; Antisovietinės apraiškos; Antisovietinių jėgų; Diskreditavimas.
ENOne of the main aims of soviet regime in Lithuania is to crush internal and external enemies. Discreditation of enemy - creation of their negative image and opinion in the society is one of the means of that fight. Political changes after the death of Stalin and changes of USSR international position forced KGB to use the means of the psychological influence, pressure besides physical repression, actions of falsehood, discreditation, varies provocations and intimidation. In such way KGB wanted to hide political repression. In a struggle with inner enemies KGB used method of discreditation, which aims to damage authority, good name of an opponent, and trust of society in him by leaking out or interpreting negatively the facts of his life and activity in order to suppress their activity, lower number of supporters and to justify the repression. Time of appearance of discreditable information, its form, to what part of society it designed is very important. In Soviet Lithuania the discreditable information is related with the person's past, his activity in independent Lithuania, during first soviet, and nazi occupation, and after war period. Personal information, like diseases, lover affairs, sexual orientations, crimes, mistakes in the past was used also.After crushing armed resistance in 1953, antisoviet opposition turned into unarmed form of resistance. It is difficult to crush it with the force that is why every more important national, religion, civil antisoviet action, was followed by discreditation actions. There were couple forms of discreditation actions - falsehood and slander campaign through press and spreading the rumours, letters or petitions incited by KGB, criminalisation of political trials, putting dissent into mental hospital. Those campaigns were carried out until the ninth decade, but during the rebirth period they did not made any affect to the public opinion. The biggest discreditation actions were carried against the biggest critics of Soviet systems - Lithuanian Catholic Church, dissidents, fighters for human rights and liberties, emigration's organization and most active persons. Discreditation method was efficient just partly, because KGB did not reach the main target - to make opposition end their antisoviet activity, although they overshadowed their good name, moral and activity. [From the publication]Since 1950‘s, KGB has been using psychological means for fighting with interior opposition. One of them was compromising persons and organisations. In Soviet Lithuania, personal activities in the independent Lithuania and in a time of Nazi occupation and other activities that looked as suspicious to the KGB were treated as compromising information. Aiming to compromise opponent, KGB attempted not only to libel them, but also depress their activities and affect public in such a way that it would disassociate with them. The most-often targets of compromise were Catholic Church, which did not allow to completely overwhelm human consciousness and develop “homo sovieticus”, and organisations of emigrants “Santara-Šviesa” and VLIK that raised the question of the occupation of Lithuania and encouraged anti-soviet movement for human rights. The author defines few forms of compromise: lie and labelling campaigns, letters and petitions wrote on the initiative of KGB, criminalisation of political cases and using psychiatry. Each of them attempted to discredit anti-soviet movement in its own way, but they were joined by common motive, i.e. depolitise anti-soviet actions distorting their authentic content and objectives and enforcing completely different meaning. Such methods of compromise were not efficient enough as they did not reach the most important goal, i.e. did not force people to stop anti-soviet activities. But it traduced the reputation of some persons, inspired strains between organisations, and stimulated suspiciousness.