LTPraėjėjau kiek daugiau nei šimtmetis nuo to laiko, kai 1921 m. rugsėjo 28 d. Švedijos Karalystė pripažino Lietuvos Respubliką de jure ir užmezgė su ja diplomatinius santykius. Lietuvos santykiai su Švedija per tą šimtmetį klostėsi labai vingiuotai, nors neretai ne dėl nuo abiejų šalių priklausančių aplinkybių. Žinoti kompleksiškai praeitį yra svarbu bei aktualu pasikeitusių sąlygų kontekste, Lietuvai ir Švedijai kaip niekada glaudžiai plėtojant bendradarbiavimą Europos Sąjungos, taip pat ateityje ir NATO rėmuose. Šios monografijos tikslas yra išnagrinėti Lietuvos vaidmenį ir Lietuvos specifinių politinių problemų įtaką Švedijos Baltijos politikoje 1917-1991 m. Tyrimo objektas yra ne tiek dvišaliai santykiai kaip tokie, bet Lietuvos vieta ir vaidmuo Švedijos politikoje Baltijos šalių atžvilgiu 1917-1991 m. Lietuvos veiksnys Švedijos Baltijos politikoje analizuojamas pasitelkus ne grynai objektyvistinę, bet intersubjektyvią dvišalių santykių perspektyvą, kai tiriami abiejų pusių - tiek Švedijos, tiek ir Lietuvos užsienio politikos ir diplomatijos subjektyvūs požiūriai ir vertinimai, nors kiek labiau išryškinant ir atskleidžiant švediškąją perspektyvą. Kita vertus, atskleidžiama švediškoji perspektyva nėra izoliuotąjį nagrinėjama sąlytyje su lietuviškąja. Būtent nuosekli dvišalė intersubjektyvi perspektyva sudaro esminį monografijos naujumą. 1917-1991 m. chronologija nurodo dviejų imperijų - carinės Rusijos ir Sovietų - žlugimą. Tos imperijos griūtys paruošė svarbias prielaidas ir atvėrė galimybių langą nepriklausomoms Baltijos valstybėms kurti (atkurti) ir integruotis į platesnę Šiaurės ir Baltijos šalių bei Europos bendriją.Pripažinimas kaip viena iš esminių sąvokų monografijoje suprantamas ne tik formalia-juridine prasme, bet ir platesniu visuomeniniu-politiniu bei kultūriniu požiūriu. Pripažinimas tad suprantamas kaip procesas, o ne vienkartinis baigtinis įvykis. Veikimo Lietuvos ir Švedijos politiniuose bei diplomatiniuose santykiuose 1917-1991 m. nebuvo labai daug, tad nemaža dalis analizės skiriama neveikimą (tikslingai pasirinktą pasyvumą) lėmusiems požiūriams ir aplinkybėms tirti. Tiriant politinius požiūrius ir vertinimus remiamasi ne tik šaltinių kritikos, bet ir politinės analizės principais. Monografijoje apsiribojama svarbiausių tematinių-probleminių Lietuvos vaidmens Švedijos Baltijos politikoje aspektų konceptualia ir empirine analize, nesistengiama aprėpti ir išsamiai išnagrinėti dvišalių santykių visumos, taigi nenagrinėjama, pavyzdžiui, imigrantų iš Baltijos šalių (Lietuvos) veikla Švedijoje 1950-1988 m. ar Baltijos šalių pogrindžio ryšiai su Švedijos žvalgyba ir pan. [Iš Įvado]
ENThe 20th century presented Sweden with increased chances to leave a notable impact on international politics. However, its role in establishing conditions for stability in the Eastern Baltic was considerably constrained. Up until 1992, Swedish foreign policy was characterised by a minimalistic and episodic regional solidarity, with a realist-egoist prioritisation ofsecurity interests. The independence ofLithuania, along with that ofthe other Baltic States, was recognised dejure by Sweden in 1921 following the collapse ofthe Tsarist Russian Empire. Geopolitical security interests and various factors played a significant role in this recognition. However, the principle of national self-determination, consistently championed by some social democrats, particularly their leader Hjalmar Branting, was also influential. Sweden, considering its limitations in resources and power, refrained from making commitments to support and strengthen the Baltic States during the ongoing great power competition in interwar Europe. As a result, Sweden declined to engage in substantial political cooperation with the Baltic States or to form a common union of states (the Scandinavian-Baltic bloc). Such commitments seemed too risky in the 1920s, given the potential threats from a resurgent Russian power and the already proven neutrality posture. Nevertheless, Sweden developed a keen interest in the independent Finland in the 1920s, viewing it as the most significant of the so-called Randstaat states. Strategists of Swedish foreign policy believed that Finnish independence could be maintained primarily if Finland refrained from forming an alliance with the Baltic countries, especially Poland. In the 1920s, both Swedish and Lithuanian positions aligned on Poland’s alliance with the other Baltic States, although for different reasons.The most serious attempt to form a union between Poland and Estonia, Latvia, and Finland - the Warsaw Treaty of 1922 - was thwarted by a coordinated Swedish-Lithuanian diplomatic effort when the Finnish Parliament refused to ratify the treaty. During the 1920s, Swedish diplomacy, albeit inconsistently, began to support the idea of the so-called ‘Little Baltic Union’ (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) excluding Finland. This approach was somewhat advantageous for Lithuania, though not an optimal security option for the Eastern Baltic. Swedish foreign policy leaders were aware ofthis and distanced themselves from taking any definite position on the Baltic Union, instead focusing on the development of bilateral economic and cultural ties in the late 1920s. On the Vilnius and Klaipėda issues, Sweden actively engaged in the affairs ofthe League of Nations as a member and a participant in the Council of League. Concerning the Vilnius issue, the people ofSweden expressed moral support, but practical assistance was limited. Notably, substantial diplomatic support from Sweden to Lithuania materialised through the recognition ofLithuania’s control over the Klaipėda region and the rejection of Polish claims to exert influence over its administration or port management. The development ofrelations between Lithuania and Sweden was adversely affected, though not officially evident, by the assessments of the autocratic regime implemented in Lithuania after December 17, 1926. Swedish diplomats, particularly critical of A. Voldemaras’ domestic and foreign policies from 1927 to 1929, contributed to this negative influence. From 1930 onward, some signs of stabilisation within the regime were observed, accompanied by the adoption of a more moderate domestic and foreign policy. However, the reliance ofthe authoritarian regime on the military was consistently identified as its primary weakness.During the 1930s, Lithuania’s cultural collaboration with Sweden experienced significant progress. The establishment of a Swedish language lectorate at Vytautas Magnus University, along with the introduction ofpermanent Swedish language teaching at the university from 1935, made a substantial contribution to this advancement. In the 1930s, Lithuanian diplomacy sought equal attention for all three Baltic States in Sweden, but at the same time had certain expectations on one specific issue - the normalisation of relations between Lithuania and Poland. Lithuania made considerable efforts to exchange foreign ministerial visits with Sweden. It was hoped that Sweden would mediate between Lithuania and Poland. Although Lithuania did not directly request such mediation, Swedish foreign policy leaders, while expressing interest in improved relations between Poland and Lithuania, remained cautious. In his dealings with both Lithuanian and Polish diplomats, and in conversations during the exchange of foreign ministers’ visits between 1935 and 1937, Swedish Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler emphasised almost every time in advance that Sweden was not a mediator, nor was it bound or obliged to be one. The possibility of more active Swedish mediation was never used, although Swedish diplomacy did make a minimal contribution by communicating Lithuania’s peaceful intentions to Polish diplomacy. thuania’s peaceful intentions to Polish diplomacy. From the mid-1930s onward, the Baltic States were largely left to their own lot in Swedish foreign policy. In an effort to appease the USSR and, crucially, to aid Finland, Sweden acknowledged the inevitability ofthe Baltic States falling more or less under the influence of the USSR whenever the Soviet Union demanded. [...]. [From the publication]