Stasys Lozoraitis - Lietuvos užsienio reikalų ministras

LTStasys Lozoraitis vyresnysis pasiekė viską, apie ką gali svajoti diplomatas profesinėje karjeroje: jam buvo suteiktas aukščiausias Nepriklausomoje Lietuvoje diplomatinis Nepaprastojo ir įgaliotojo ministro rangas; 1934-1938 metais, kone sunkiausias per visą tarpukarį, S. Lozoraitis vadovavo Užsienio reikalų ministerijai. Iki šiol nėra analogų Lietuvos diplomatijos istorijoje - ministru jis tapo būdamas 35 metų (tuo metu jis buvo jauniausias Europos užsienio reikalų ministras); 1940-1983 m., su nedidele pertrauka Antrojo pasaulinio karo metais, S. Lozoraičiui teko išimtinė misija - jis ėjo unikalias užsienyje likusios Lietuvos Diplomatinės tarnybos šefo pareigas. Pagal vadovavimo Užsienio reikalų ministerijai (URM) trukmę iš 11 tarpukario Lietuvos ministrų už S. Lozoraitį šias pareigas ilgiau ėjo tik Dovas Zaunius. Vienintelis Nepriklausomos Lietuvos ministras, kilęs iš Mažosios Lietuvos, D. Zaunius ministerijai vadovavo lygiai ketverius su puse metų, t. y. nepilnomis dviem savaitėmis ilgiau negu S. Lozoraitis. S. Lozoraitis įėjo į diplomatijos istoriją ir kaip pirmasis Lietuvos diplomatas, išrinktas Tarptautinės diplomatinės akademijos Paryžiuje nariu. Tarp visų Lietuvos diplomatų nebent tik Augustinas Voldemaras susilaukė daugiau tarptautinės bendrijos dėmesio. Vis dėlto dėmesys Voldemarui labiau siejosi su jo ekscentrišku elgesiu negu jo asmeniu. S. Lozoraitis, priešingai nei kai kurie jo pirmtakai, niekada nepakliuvo į skandalingosios kronikos puslapius. Į Lietuvos diplomatijos istoriją jis įeis pirmiausia kaip profesionalas, realistas, diplomatas, pasiūlęs naują Lietuvos nacionalinio saugumo ir užsienio politikos koncepciją Antrojo pasaulinio karo išvakarėse. S. Lozoraičio profesines diplomato savybes pripažino ir vertino dauguma amžininkų. [Iš teksto, p. 25-26]

ENLozoraitis' New Course introduced conceptual changes into Lithuanian foreign policy. A supporter of collective security, Lozoraitis resolutely renounced the traditional orientation toward Berlin and Moscow. During the first two years (1934-1935) of his leadership, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reoriented Lithuania toward France and the Soviet Union, toward states that had sought the formation of an Eastern pact which provided for mutual assistance among participating countries. Lozoraitis got along with Litvinov well enough, and he understood the importance ofrelations with Moscow. However, he did not want these relations to become protectoral, to make Lithuania dependent on Moscow. Lozoraitis would never have consented to allow Lithuanian foreign policy to be made not at Vienybė Square, but at Vorovsky Square, not at the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but at the USSR Foreign Affairs Commissariat in Moscow. In view ofthe growing dangerfrom Germany, Lozoraitis devoted especially much attention to matters concerning Klaipėda. Naturally, Lithuanian attention increased toward those countries that were signatories of the Klaipėda Convention, primarily France and Great Britain. However, relations with these great powers were not limited only to matters concerning Klaipėda. Security guarantees were also sought. From 1936 onward, the influence of London and Paris became much stronger in Lithuanian foreign policy, while that of the Soviets correspondingly decreased. In 1938 it was minimal, the smallest it had ever been between the wars. From the very first days of his leadership at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lozoraitis spoke out in favor of increased Baltic cooperation in all areas, including military affairs. In his efforts to find a modus vivendi with Poland, Lozoraitis did notplan merely to revive the Vilnius question in international politics; his intentions reached much further.Normalization ofrelations with Poland was to strengthen the Lithuanian position in Klaipėda and open up broader prospects of forming a Baltic alliance. Implementation of the New Course would undoubtedly have stabilized the situation in the entire region between the USSR and Germany. Unfortunately, Lozoraitis did not succeed in implementing the most important part of his New Course; he did not succeed in finding a modus vivendi with Poland through compromise. The most importantreason for his failure was Beck's position. After Pilsudski's death, Beck's significance and influence grew enormously in Poland. Seeking great power status for Poland, Beck was determined to embark on rather dangerous schemes. Warsaw's flirtation with Berlin was one such scheme which changed the settled geopolitical order in Europe. Polish pretensions to a great power role in Central and Eastern Europe provoked hostility from almost all of her neighbors (except Romania), especially Lithuania and Czechoslovakia. Beck's foreign policy assigned Lithuania a secondary or even tertiary role. He completely ignored Lithuanian interests, and in the dispute between Lithuania and Poland he was guided only by his own self-interest. In this area he seems to have achieved more than Piłsudski had. For Beck the only solution to the dispute was complete capitulation by Lithuania. Lozoraitis' moderate course did not conform at all to Beck's interests and plans. By giving instructions to persecute the Lithuanian minority in the Vilnius region and by provoking conflict along the border, Beck consciously sought a crisis with Lithuania, hoping by radical means to cut the Gordian knot in Lithuanian-Polish relations. Thus, Poland was the one to increase tensions, and Polish historians acknowledge this fact. However, Beck's ambitions caused only part of the problem.Unlike Lithuania, in the Polish political spectrum there were no forces supporting a mutually acceptable normalization of relations with at least partial compensation for Lithuanian losses. There were also other-internal-reasons for the failure of Lozoraitis' course. The seizure of eastern territories and the capital engendered a strong anti-Polish mood in Lithuania. Beck's uncompromising politics inflamed them even more. Influential forces that were close to President Smetona and spoke out against the normalization of relations with Poland often caused no fewer problems for Lozoraitis than Beck's stubbornness. On this account, he did not have room for tactical maneuvers or ultimately a free hand to realize his program. With rare exceptions (Generals Raštikis and Černius, the diplomats Klimas and Šaulys) the political elite of Lithuania had an imperfect and sometimes even distorted understanding of the essence of the New Course, especially its Polish part. On the other hand, Lozoraitis lacked "weight" in internal politics. He did not belong to any party; therefore, his New Course did not have a strong base of support. Lozoraitis' activities depended very much on the political will of President Smetona and Prime Minister Tūbelis. Both Lithuanian leaders often made the most important decisions concerning relations with Poland without even consulting the Minister of Foreign Affairs. They simply left him their implementation, and Lozoraitis was held responsible for the consequences of these decisions. That is what happened in March 1938, when Poland gave Lithuania an ultimatum. [From the publication]