"Už Tėvynę ir Carą": 1812 m. karo 100-mečio šventimas kaip jaunimo imperinio lojalumo konstravimo įrankis

LTStraipsnyje pasitelkus 1812 m. karo 100-mečio šventimo atvejį nagrinėjama, kaip, kokiomis priemonėmis centrinė ir vietos valdžia siekė skiepyti Rusijos valstybės vientisumo vaizdinį bei konstruoti tarp jaunimo ištikimų imperijos pavaldinių savivoką. Reikšminiai žodžiai: 1812 m. karas, istorinė atmintis, imperinis lojalumas. [Iš leidinio]

ENThroughout the 19th century, officials of the Russian Empire in the lands of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) faced the challenge of forming and ensuring the imperial loyalty of non-dominant ethnic groups. It was a difficult task because some of the new subordinates upheld the hopes of restoring the former statehood, which they had tried to implement during the Napoleonic Wars and uprisings in 1830–1831 and 1863–1864. Based on the example of the cultural formation of the historical memory of the 1812 war, the article aims to assess how and by what means the central and local governments tried to implant the image of the Russian state’s integrity and to construct the self-image of the loyal subordinates of the empire. The 1812 war episode in the lands of the former GDL perfectly illustrates two competing historical memories. The analysis of the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the war of 1812 highlights the content and meanings of the imperial discourse regarding the events of war and the local peculiarities of these meanings. In the Northwest Krai, representatives of the local government structures and local Russian intelligentsia (first, teachers) responded to the 1812 war as the Polish fight for freedom, and the symbol of political autonomy created the so-called regional narrative. The academic, educational and popular historical literature in Vilnius has explained how the Polish hopes associated with Napoleon were unfounded; i.e., the French emperor had no intention of restoring the former Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth using historical boundaries but rather, he sought to complement his army with Polish soldiers. At the same time, it was emphasised that, unlike Napoleon, the Russian Emperor Alexander I cared for the development and dissemination of Polish education and science and had reflected on rebuilding statehood.However, the Polish support for Napoleon stopped the plans of the Russian Empire government. In addition, the interpretation was made that only nobility, one part of local society represented by the Poles, rather than other ethnic groups, for example, Lithuanians or Belarusians, were supportive of Napoleon. The developers of the so-called regional narrative had two goals. First, they looked to justify the Russian Empire government’s discriminatory policy against citizens of Polish origin. Second, they ‘prevented’ the use of the 1812 war as a historical argument when speaking about the Polish and Lithuanian common historical past and the fight and the possible political future, publicly presented in the Polish national discourse of the early 20th century. However, the question remains: How much did the so-called regional narrative affect the change of political and cultural attitudes, initially, in the Polish younger generation? It should be noted that this regional narrative was not widely disseminated. As a result, only individual academic works and the sparse historic educational literature used it. Most teachers involved in educating their students have applied common imperial discourse and distinguished the dual consequences of the 1812 war linked to the dissemination of ideas of Russian nationalism and imperial loyalty.The 1812 war was primarily treated as an example of the social (and even gender) unity of the Russian nation, the expression of the patriotic attitudes of the Russian commonwealth, the commitment and struggle for the homeland and the integrity of the Russian Empire. However, in Vilnius, unlike in Moscow, the publishing industry had not developed publications specially oriented to young people, and the works that were published could not consolidate the mental image of imperial propaganda and its emotional effect. In addition, paintings (for example, the case of Fedot Kudrinsky) depicting events from the 1812 war were used in the inner governorates but not in the Northwestern Krai of the Russian Empire. Keywords: the war of 1812, historical memory, imperial loyalty. [From the publication]