Valstybė ir atmintis: atminties kultūros ir jų reguliavimo būdai Lietuvoje, Vidurio ir Rytų Europoje

LTKnygoje Valstybė ir atmintis. Atminties kultūros ir jų reguliavimo būdai Lietuvoje, Vidurio ir Rytų Europoje pateikiama šešių šalių: Baltarusijos, Lenkijos, Lietuvos, Rusijos, Ukrainos ir Vokietijos lyginamoji atminties kultūrų ir istorijos politikų analizė XXI amžiuje. Patikslinami teiginiai, susiję su pavienėmis sudedamosiomis atminties kultūrų dalimis (Vokietijos atvejis), atskleidžiama minėtųjų šalių atminties kultūros genezė (Lenkijos atvejis), parodomi atminties kultūrų formavimo modelių skirtumai tarp autoritariškai ir demokratiškai valdomų visuomenių tipų. [Anotacija knygoje]

ENPresented to readers here is an analysis of the contemporary cultural memory and history policies of six Central and East European states: Belarus, Poland, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine and Germany. The principle of variety was adhered to in their selection: i) Most of the selected states - Belarus, Poland, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine - can be attributed to the post-communist countries category; Germany alone, if we ignore the fact that it consists of the former German Demoratic Republic (GDR), is considered one of the Western democracies. 2) Belarus and Russia are held to be authoritarian states, while Ukraine is a state trying to overcome its authoritarian legacy. Lithuania and Poland are considered young democracies, whereas Germany is one of the democratic states. All of the selected states have experience of overcoming their communist legacy, although they did this by applying different measures. Lithuania and Germany belong to that group of states who categorically reject their communist legacy. In the case of Germany, it is also worthwhile mentioning that the experience of the communist GDR on the scale of the entire country does not play a very significant role in cultural memory. Belarus meanwhile continues to associate itself with the vision of a state with a communist past. A similar situation is unfolding in Russia as well, who despite having dismissed pursuing a communist ideology still sees itself as the successor of the Soviet Union’s traditions. Poland, despite the de-communisation reforms enacted in recent years, has a mixed position regarding its communist legacy, though this country’s differences compared to Lithuania and Germany have obviously decreased. Meanwhile, in Ukraine the process of overcoming communism has only just begun.This study, where the idea of the state as a factor stabilising cultural memory was at the centre of attention, allowed specifying the genesis of contemporary cultural memories in separate countries: in the case of Poland the focus was on Jerzy Giedroyc and the impact of the Kultura journal released in Paris on contemporary cultural memory. In the case of Germany, the dominant cultural memory model in this country was supplemented, stating that alongside the German people’s sense of collective guilt for the Holocaust, there was and is also the German opposition to the national socialist dictatorship and “economic miracle” narratives. Analysis of the cultural memories of six countries clearly revealed the changed significance of cultural memories in the 21st century on both domestic and foreign policy. The changed world order at the start of the 21st century saw the formation of major political and military blocs, which incorporated smaller states into their structure, and where the latter, relying on the other larger bloc members and demanding solidarity from them, also became embroiled in or initiated information wars in the region. For this reason, any deliberations about the necessity of history policy, which commenced in Germany towards the end of the 20th century, became a reality by the 21st century. Specifically in Poland, Russia and Ukraine, special institutions were formed responsible for the execution of a history policy mission. In Lithuania, Germany and, to an extent Belarus, state-driven activities in the field of history policy were also activated. These actions led to the emergence of new types of conflicts in the world, at the centre of which lay assessments of the past.Prognoses from the end of the 20th century about the end of history proved to be unfounded. Quite the opposite, the past became an important composite part of not only domestic but also the foreign policy of countries. The intensity of using the past for the purposes of state policy makes the 21st century stand out significantly from earlier historical epochs. The question of where these processes will lead the world and the region under discussion remains unanswered. The material analysed allows making only preliminary generalisations, which are presented in the final part of this book. Following the significant studies by Jan and Aleida Assmann in the field of cultural memory, who formulated the theoretical concept of cultural This study, where the idea of the state as a factor stabilising cultural memory was at the centre of attention, allowed specifying the genesis of contemporary cultural memories in separate countries: in the case of Poland the focus was on Jerzy Giedroyc and the impact of the Kultura journal released in Paris on contemporary cultural memory. In the case of Germany, the dominant cultural memory model in this country was supplemented, stating that alongside the German people’s sense of collective guilt for the Holocaust, there was and is also the German opposition to the national socialist dictatorship and “economic miracle” narratives. Analysis of the cultural memories of six countries clearly revealed the changed significance of cultural memories in the 21st century on both domestic and foreign policy. The changed world order at the start of the 21st century saw the formation of major political and military blocs, which incorporated smaller states into their structure, and where the latter, relying on the other larger bloc members and demanding solidarity from them, also became embroiled in or initiated information wars in the region. [...]. [From the publication]